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I. Introduction 
 Even before Justice Stevens wrote his so-called Lackey memo,
2
 prisoners on death row 
were asserting that lengthy delays—many times decades3—before their executions were 
constitutionally infirm.
4
 As Stevens and plaintiffs presented the claim, it embodied two discrete 
points. First, the mere fact of delay, usually accompanied by horrible prison conditions including 
solitary confinement, was itself “cruel and unusual.” Prisoners were made to wait indefinite 
periods of time before they were killed, sometimes due to the fault of the state, sometimes due to 
their own appeals, but in any case, the possibility of their execution kept on being put off. This 
wait, said some, was akin to torture.
5
 The second argument was different. It said that the fact of 
delay, while perhaps bad in itself, removed the original penological justifications for their 
                                                          
2
 Lackey v. Texas, 514 U.S. 1045 (1995). 
3
 See, e.g., Brent E. Newton, The Slow Wheels of Furman’s Machinery of Death, 13 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 41, 42 
(2012) (noting that based on DOJ statistics the “average condemned inmate in 2010” spent “nearly fifteen years 
under a sentence of death before being executed” but concluding that the actual average is closer to twenty years); 
Alex Kozinski & Sean Gallagher, Death: The Ultimate Run-On Sentence, 46 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1, 10–11 
(“Putting aside the relatively few cases in which a death row inmate simply gives up, a case that comes to its 
conclusion within seven years of the crime is relatively rare. Ten years is about average, and cases like that of 
Duncan Peder McKenzie, whose case took over two decades to shuttle its way repeatedly between the state and 
federal courts, are not that atypical.”); see also Brent E. Newton, Justice Kennedy, The Purposes of Capital 
Punishment, and the Future of Lackey Claims, 62 BUFF. L. REV. 979, 991 (2014) (last ten people executed by 
Florida spent an “average of 24,9 years on death row” (quoting Justice Kennedy)); Megan Elizabeth Tongue, Note, 
Omnes Vulnerant, Postuma Necat: All the Hours Wound, the Last One Kills: The Lengthy Stay on Death Row in 
America, 80 MO. L. REV. 897 (2015 (“amount of time an inmate spends on death row has almost tripled over the 
past few decades”); Jones v. Chappell, 31 F. Supp. 3d 1050, 1062 (C.D. Cal. 2014), appeal dismissed (Dec. 1, 
2014), rev’d sub nom. Jones v. Davis, 806 F.3d 538 (9th Cir. 2015) (“[In California] [t]he review process takes an 
average of 25 years, and the delay is only getting longer.” ). 
4
 One of the earliest versions of a Lackey claims seems to be Chessman v. Dixon, in the Ninth Circuit. Chessman v. 
Dickson, 275 F.2d 604, 607 (9th Cir. 1960) (being confined for eleven and one-half years on death row amounts to 
cruel and unusual punishment). See also Lackey, 514 U.S. at 1045; Valle v. Florida, 132 S. Ct. 1 (2011) (Breyer, J., 
dissenting from denial of stay and certiori.); Thompson v. McNeil, 556 U.S. 1114 (2009); Smith v. Arizona, 552 
U.S. 985 (2007) (Breyer, J., dissenting from denial of certiori.); Foster v. Florida, 537 U.S. 990 (2002). 
5
 Valle, 132 S. Ct. at 1 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
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punishment.
6
 The extended delay vitiated any deterrent potential of the punishment; and delay 
made it no longer the case that their punishments were in any sense “retributive.”7 The outrage 
that prompted the demand for their death might have faded (or been otherwise sated);
8
 the 
prisoners too, could be said to be different people, no longer deserving of death as they once 
might have been.
9
 
 Lackey arguments have overwhelmingly failed,
10
 but not for want of trying. One plaintiff 
came close in Jones when he won at the district court level
11—which was nevertheless reversed 
on appeal.
12
 What I want to suggest in this essay is that these arguments may be insufficiently 
radical.
13
 Many scholars and two Justices have asserted, especially in the second variant of the 
Lackey claim, that delay undermines the arguments for the death penalty, because a late 
execution no longer deters, or satisfies retribution. However this might be true of deterrence—
                                                          
6
 Thompson, 129 S. Ct. at 1300 (“[D]elaying an execution does not further public purposes of retribution and 
deterrence but only diminishes whatever possible benefit society might receive from petitioner’s death.”). 
7
 Valle, 132 S. Ct. at 2 (Breyer J., dissenting) (“The commonly accepted justifications for the death penalty are close 
to nonexistent in a case such as this one.”). 
8
 Id. (“And, I would ask how often that community's sense of retribution would forcefully insist upon a death that 
comes only several decades after the crime was committed.”). 
9
 Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726 (2015) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
10
 E.g., State v. Azania, 865 N.E.2d 994, 998 decision clarified on reh’g, 875 N.E.2d 701 (Ind. 2007) (“It appears 
that no Lackey claim has been successful”).  
11
 Jones v. Chappell, 31 F. Supp. 3d 1050, 1069 (C.D. Cal. 2014), appeal dismissed (Dec. 1, 2014), rev’d sub nom. 
Jones v. Davis, 806 F.3d 538 (9th Cir. 2015)(“Inordinate and unpredictable delay has resulted in a death penalty 
system in which very few of the hundreds of individuals sentenced to death have been, or even will be, executed by 
the State. It has resulted in a system in which arbitrary factors, rather than legitimate ones like the nature of the 
crime or the date of the death sentence, determine whether an individual will actually be executed. And it has 
resulted in a system that serves no penological purpose. Such a system is unconstitutional.”).  The district court 
judge in Jones also made an independent argument that the imposition in any one case was “arbitrary.”  I do not deal 
with that argument at any length here.  Jones v. Chappell, 31 F. Supp. 3d 1050, 1053 (C.D. Cal. 2014), rev’d sub 
nom. Jones v. Davis, 806 F.3d 538 (9th Cir. 2015) (“Indeed, for most, systemic delay has made their execution so 
unlikely that the death sentence carefully and deliberately imposed by the jury has been quietly transformed into one 
no rational jury or legislature could ever impose: life in prison, with the remote possibility of death. As for the 
random few for whom execution does become a reality, they will have languished for so long on Death Row that 
their execution will serve no retributive or deterrent purpose and will be arbitrary.”).  
12
 Jones, 806 F.3d at 553. 
13
 See infra Part III.  
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and I largely leave deterrence to the side in this essay
14—it is not obvious that a delay in 
execution means that a punishment is no longer retributively just. It depends on what retribution 
is. And here both advocates of the Lackey argument as well as the Supreme Court have been less 
than clear as to which version of retribution they are endorsing. This matters, because on some 
versions of retribution the Lackey argument works, but on others it falls flat.
15
 The first 
contribution of my paper is to clarify the various meanings of retribution, and to run the Lackey 
argument through them. It seems surprising that such a fundamental part of the Lackey claim 
should have gone unexamined for so long. Different Supreme Courts over the years have 
presented very different versions of retribution,
16
 and whether delay undermines retribution 
critically depends on which version we adopt. 
 But this conceptual clarification leads me to the second and more fundamental 
contribution. It turns out that that version of retribution under which Lackey succeeds is not very 
persuasive, but that the version of retribution in which the Lackey claims goes through has a 
strange and problematic implication—so strange, in fact, that we should wonder whether it can 
be a permissible purpose for governments to pursue.
17
 Briefly, my argument is this.  If retribution 
is understood as simply expressing community outrage and the need to satisfy that outrage, then 
the Lackey claim seems to go through. It is plausible that community outrage may fade over 
time, and so we may actually—after 10, 20, 30 years18—no longer be as outraged as we once 
were: accordingly, the claim that we need death to satisfy that outrage doesn’t have the same 
                                                          
14
 The Court has routinely said that the main reason for imposing the death penalty is not deterrence, but retribution. 
Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 461 (1994) (Retribution is the “primary justification for the death penalty”).  
15
 See infra Part II.  
16
 See infra Part II.  
17
 See infra Part III. 
18
 Appendix A in the district court Jones opinion documents that there are currently dozens of inmates who have 
been on California’s death row between 30 and 35 years. Jones, 31 F. Supp. 3d at 1069 
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bite. If the purpose of killing someone was for this purpose, the purpose is arguably no longer 
served when people no longer care, or are indifferent about the execution (or whatever outrage 
they had is satisfied by the long term in prison on death row). 
 But this community outrage version of retribution is not all that appealing.  It smacks of 
revenge, for one. Even bracketing that, it is not even a satisfying view of retribution.
19
 It leaves 
too much in the hands of fickle community sentiment. What if a community values some lives 
too cheaply, so that when they ought to be outraged, they are not? Nor is it obvious as an 
empirical matter that community outrage will fade over time—couldn’t we stoke it back up again 
as the execution date nears?
20
 So this version of retribution has problems. If it was the only 
version of retribution we had on offer, then the Lackey claim might succeed, although even then 
it might be an empirical question as to whether the community was still angry after decades of 
waiting. If they were, the claim would fail. 
 There is a better and more persuasive version of retribution out there.  As opposed to the 
community sentiment version, this version says that some people who have done terrible crimes, 
and as a matter of justice they ought to die. If a community does not feel that these people ought 
to die, then it is wrong—they should feel that way. And if a person is not sentenced to death then 
we collectively have made a mistake, a mistake that threatens justice being done on this earth. 
Kant advocated for this kind of retributivism, so it has a philosophically respectable lineage.
21
 In 
                                                          
19
 In my criticism below, I also leave out an obvious concern: who is the relevant community?  I assume it includes 
at least those immediately affected by the crime in question, most especially the victim.  
20
 See, e.g., Bob Ross, Old Wounds Reopen for River Ridge Parents as Daughter’s Killer Resentenced, TIMES-
PICAYUNE (Mar. 5, 2012), http://www.nola.com/crime/index.ssf/2012/03/twelve_years_after_daughters_k.html. 
21
 IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS OF JUSTICE; PART I OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 140 
(John. Ladd trans., Hackett Publishing 2d. 1999) (“Even if a civil society were to dissolve itself by common 
agreement of all its members (for example, if the people inhabiting an island decided to separate and disperse 
themselves around the world), the last murderer remaining in prison must first be executed, so that everyone will 
duly receive what his actions are worth and so that the bloodguilt thereof will not be fixed on the people because 
they failed to insist on carrying out the punishment; for if they fail to do so, they may be regarded as accomplices in 
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some instances, retribution may demand death, no matter what the community feels. If this is the 
version of retribution we accept, then it is not obvious that the retributive purpose of punishment 
is undermined by delay. So long as the person is executed, a delay in the date of that execution 
may be unfortunate, but it does not remove the point of executing the person: it was to give that 
person their “just deserts.”22  
 In one large set of cases, however, delay would hurt the satisfaction of this sort of 
intrinsic justice retribution. If delay means that the death row inmate in prison dies before being 
executed,
23
 then he will have cheated his just punishment. In other words, if retribution demands 
execution by the state, it is not enough that the person have died in prison, anymore than if the 
prisoner had been hit by a truck before being captured this would have satisfied the demands of 
retribution. We are all going to die eventually, after all—we are all in this sense “sentenced to 
death.” But the unique thing about the person who deserves to die, is that he deserves to die in a 
certain way: at the hands of the state, that is, at the hands of us. 
 So there is a version of retribution in which the Lackey claim would in theory succeed, 
but in a way that would help no inmate who is still alive. But noting that retribution might 
demand the execution of someone at death’s door may lead us to reflect on retribution as a 
purpose in the first place. Retribution may be, in some guises, a philosophically attractive theory. 
But for all that, is it an acceptable purpose for the state to have? This is an under-examined part 
of death penalty writing and punishment jurisprudence more generally. There is plenty of talk 
about whether the death penalty is a deterrent or whether it satisfies retribution. But what makes 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
this public violation of legal justice.”). See generally Jeffrie G. Murphy, Does Kant Have a Theory of Punishment?, 
87 COLUM. L. REV. 509 (1987). 
22
 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 319–20 (2002) (defining retribution as “the interest in seeing the offender gets 
his ‘just deserts’”). 
23
 This, in fact, is what happens in a large percentage of cases. See infra Part II.C.  
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these purposes appropriate, and by what standard should we assess them?
24
 The Supreme Court 
at various times has written that retribution was going out of fashion as a theory of punishment;
25
 
it also too expressed the possibility of some purposes (e.g., eugenics
26
) that we would never 
countenance as acceptable today. They would be beyond the pale. It is thus something we should 
consider that some purposes of punishment, when we understand them aright, are simply not 
acceptable purposes for the state to pursue. 
 I think that this is what we should say about the intrinsic variety of retribution—the kind 
of retribution that is robust enough to resist most Lackey claims. The argument here is 
speculative, and points to the need for more thinking in this area, but I base it on two claims.
27
 
First, the intrinsic retribution theory could represent an impermissible endorsement by the state 
of a sort of quasi-religious view. It is recognized that the state cannot establish a particular 
religious view over others, and the intrinsic version of retribution represents nothing more than a 
religious view on the nature of responsibility, and then need to exact justice in this world (rather 
than the next). Ronald Dworkin has made a similar claim in relation to the abortion debate,
28
 and 
I try to transplant his argument into this new context. 
                                                          
24
 Michele Cotton, Back with A Vengeance: The Resilience of Retribution As an Articulated Purpose of Criminal 
Punishment, 37 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1313, 1313 (2000).  
25
 Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 248–50 (1949) (Holding because reformation and rehabilitation—especially 
in the form of modern probation practices aimed at restoring offenders to “useful citizenship”—have become 
“important goals of punishment” that “[r]etribution is no longer the dominant objective of the criminal law”).  
26
  See Carol S. Steiker, Jordan M. Steiker, Capital Punishment: A Century of Discontinuous Debate, 100 J. CRIM. L. 
& CRIMINOLOGY 643, 655 (2010) (discussion of history of eugenics argument for capital punishment). 
27
 See infra Part III.  
28
 See generally, RONALD DWORKIN, LIFE’S DOMINION: AN ARGUMENT ABOUT ABORTION, EUTHANASIA, AND 
INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM (1993). 
8 
 
 But the intrinsic retribution argument can also be seen as—and has been seen as by 
members of the Court—a kind of personal vendetta, a kind of revenge.29 It is also, we might 
think, impermissible for the state to base its purposes on passion, or hatred.
30
 And this, too, is 
what intrinsic retribution can look like. Consider the implications if a person is on his deathbed, 
moments away from dying, and his appeals have been exhausted. Intrinsic retribution says that 
we still need to execute this person in order for justice to be served. If this is not some high 
minded belief in settling moral scores in this world, it does look to be a lot like vengeance and 
perhaps it is here that intrinsic retribution seems to sort of bottom out in community outrage. It is 
not enough, after all, that the prisoner dies; it must be at our hands. We get to choose the time of 
his dying—he can’t go on his terms.  This need to kill either looks like some religious 
compulsion gone wrong, or is really a sophisticated kind of vendetta, motivated by animus, 
against the death row inmate. Or so I want to suggest. 
 My paper has three parts. In the first part I look at the history of Lackey claims, and try to 
pare down the essence of those claims. In this, I am helped by situating my argument in this 
paper against some recent claims made by Russell Christopher, one of the most philosophically 
sophisticated scholars to examine Lackey claims in depth.
31
 Christopher’s work helps me to pare 
away a fallacious rebuttal made to Lackey claims and to focus on the novel parts of my 
argument. In the second part, I spell out the two versions of retribution with which the court may 
be operating in considering Lackey claims. Part of this is expository, and historical. It is striking 
                                                          
29
 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 112 (1958) (equating “forcing retribution from the offender” with “naked vengeance” 
in a case considering exile as punishment for desertion during time of war). 
30
 A similar sensibility is behind the Court’s holding that animus or hositility to a vulnerable group cannot be a 
legitimate stand end that justifies discrimination. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632 (1996). But see, (“But I had 
thought that one could consider certain conduct reprehensible—murder, for example, or polygamy, or cruelty to 
animals—and could exhibit even ‘animus’ toward such conduct.”). Id. at 644 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
31
 Russel L. Christopher, Death Delayed is Retribution Denied, 99 MINN. L. REV. 421 (2014). 
9 
 
that the Court should be inconsistent in what it means by retribution, given how boilerplate its 
invocations of that purpose have become in its recent opinions. I also, in Part II, appeal in 
passing to several important recent papers that look at the important role time plays in our 
understanding of punishment.
32
 I show how Lackey claims can work if we adopt a version of 
retribution that is time sensitive, but how they fail if we choose to side with a time-insensitive 
version. This leads me to the third and final part of my paper, where I question whether the state 
can pursue time-insensitive version of retribution as appropriate state purpose. I argue that it 
can’t, which leads me to my overall conclusion: either Lackey claims work under an unattractive 
and weak theory of retributive punishment, or they don’t work, but the theory under which they 
don’t work makes retribution off-limits as an appropriate purpose of state punishment. 
II. Lackey 
The canonical statement of a Lackey claim is by Justice Stevens, written as a dissent to a 
denial of certiori in Lackey’s case.33 It was more of an invitation than an argument but it has 
since been elaborated on by another member of the Court (Justice Breyer
34
) and disputed on the 
Court (by Justice Thomas
35
) and launched a score of attempts by death row inmates. I here want 
to lay the foundation of the Lackey argument, show its variations, and try to strip out several 
debates that it has spawned which seem to me to either focus on irrelevant issues, or to be not the 
strongest point of the Lackey argument. It is no secret that many of those who side with Lackey 
                                                          
32
 See infra Part II. 
33
 Lackey v. Texas, 514 U.S. 1045 (1995). 
34
 For references see infra, n. 4.  
35
 Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S. 990, 992 (1999) (mem.) (Thomas, J. concurring in denial of certiori) (“Five years ago, 
Justice STEVENS issued an invitation to state and lower courts to serve as ‘laboratories’ in which the viability of 
this claim could receive further study. These courts have resoundingly rejected the claim as meritless.”) (citation to 
Lackey memo omitted). 
10 
 
oppose the death penalty root-and-branch.
36
 But it is important, I think, for the general success of 
Lackey claims is that they be presented as different than arguments that say that the death penalty 
itself is cruel and unusual (even though it may be).
37
 Presenting Lackey claims as independent 
arguments increases their appeal to those who may otherwise believe the death penalty is just 
(which includes, apparently, a majority of the Court). It also, as a matter of analytical clarity, 
separates Lackey claims from general arguments that putting someone to death is unjust. When 
Stevens wrote his memo, it was I think in this spirit: that plaintiffs have something in addition to 
argue, instead of only a general opposition to the death penalty and any other procedural claims 
they may have. 
A.  The two Lackey claims38 
As presented over the years by Justices Breyer and Stevens, the Lackey claims actually 
composes two discrete claims, although both press the problem with delaying imposition of the 
death penalty for an extended period of time.
39
 The first kind of Lackey claim—and the one, I 
will say up front, that I am less interested in—deals with the punishment inherent in the delay 
itself. Waiting to be executed, or rather, waiting a long time to be executed exacts a terrible 
physical and psychological toll on the prison, to the point where just waiting is enough for his 
punishment to be “cruel and unusual.”40 On this version of the Lackey claim, there is something 
                                                          
36
 Justice Breyer joined by Justice Ginsburg called for revisiting the constitutionality of the death penalty itself last 
summer. Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2755 (2015) (Breyer, J., dissenting). But see Christopher, supra note 31, 
at 484 (“Capital punishment proponents might even have the most to gain [if the Supreme Court granted certiori and 
decided a Lackey claim].”). 
37
 Christopher, supra note 31, at 426 (clarifying that the Lackey claim is that execution following decades long 
incarceration is cruel and unusual and not the claim that any execution is cruel and unusual). 
38
 For a good summary of these two claims which I follow, see Fletcher’s dissent in Ceja. Ceja v. Stewart, 134 F.3d 
1368, 1376 (9th Cir. 1998). I also entertain a third type of Lackey claim, below. See infra Part I.C.  
39
 Lackey v. Texas, 514 U.S. 1045 (1995).  
40
 See Valle, 132 S. Ct. at 1 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“I have little doubt about the cruelty of so long a period of 
incarceration under sentence of death”); Furman, 408 U.S. at 238 (Brennan, J., concurring) (“[T]he prospect of 
pending execution exacts a frightful toll during the inevitable long wait between the imposition of sentence and the 
11 
 
in the delay itself that makes it an impermissible punishment (what this is, precisely, is 
something I will get to shortly). The second kind of Lackey claim, however, deals with the 
purpose of executing someone after a long delay, and not merely with the delay itself. After a 
long delay, this second argument goes, there really may be no point in executing the person. The 
deterrent value of such an execution will be minor after such a long delay, if not non-existent—at 
the very least, the deterrent value will have already been realized in the long prison stay, so no 
additional deterrent value will be gotten by the execution. So too will the retribution exacted be 
either already realized (he will have suffered a long delay already, and certainly this can count as 
“retribution” for his crime) or too little (people will no longer have the same outrage they did 
when the person committed his crime, so his death will mean little to them and so not required 
by retribution).
41
 On this second Lackey claim, the problem is the execution happening after the 
delay, not merely the horror inherent in the delay itself. I am more interested in the second kind 
of Lackey claim. 
But I should say some things about the first type of Lackey claim.
42
 As even its proponents 
note, there is some ambiguity in the content of the claim, especially when we put it at a high 
level of generality. Two points are worth mentioning here about the ambiguities in the first 
Lackey claim. First, how much delay is too much, or enough to give rise to the anxiety and the 
worry of a pending execution? How long does the delay have to be to make it too long? The 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
actual infliction of death”); Knight, at 994 (imprisonment under threat of imminent execution is “horrible,” and 
“dehumanizing”); People v., Anderson, 493 P.2d 880, 894 (Ca. 1972) (noting “dehumanizing effects of the lengthy 
imprisonment prior to execution” which are “often so degrading and brutalizing to the human spirit as to constitute 
psychological torture”). For a meditation on the topic, see Albert Camus, Reflections on the Guillotine, in 
RESISTANCE, REBELLION, AND DEATH 150 (Justin O’Brien, trans., 1963). 
41
 Christopher, supra note 31, at 432. 
42
 Later in this section, I discuss another possible interpretation of this kind of Lackey claim, which I think should be 
separated and considered as a possible “third” Lackey argument.  
12 
 
answer to that seems to me uncertain itself.
43
 One might imagine that even learning that one’s 
execution is a month away, or a week away, would inspire anxiety about the precise date and 
time that one would die.
44
 The so-called “death row” phenomenon can even be said to be 
inherent in the very act of having a death penalty.
45
 Of course, one might say that if a delay of a 
month is bad, a fortiori a delay of ten or more years is even worse, more psychologically 
damaging than that one month (it may differ depending on the psychological stability of the 
inmates; the anxiety may be greater or lesser depending on the person).
46
 But it is hard to draw a 
firm line here, one that clearly puts the cruel and unusual nature punishment on one side of the 
line, and a permissible punishment on the other side. And indeed, it is most plausible to say that 
this anxiety is always present.
47
 That is why the first Lackey claim, to my mind, comes very close 
to simply being an objection to the death penalty: a penalty which causes this kind of suffering, 
                                                          
43
 Foster v. Florida, 537 U.S. at 991 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“the combination of uncertainty in the execution and 
long delay is arguably cruel”).  
44
 See, e.g., In re Medley, 134 U.S. 160, 172 (“[W]hen a prisoner sentenced by a court to death is confined in the 
penitentiary awaiting the execution of the sentence, one of the most horrible feelings to which he can be subjected 
during that time is the uncertainty during the whole of it . . . .”). Note how the mere fact of being sentenced to die at 
some point in the future gives rise to some uncertainty as to when exactly that will be.  
45
 Such a conclusion seems to be made by Newton when he says in a footnote that “Such [awful] conditions are 
inherently part of the death penalty.” Newton, Slow Wheels, supra note 3 at n. 62. For discussion of the death row 
phenomenon in connection with a Lackey claim, see, e.g., McKenzie v. Day, 57 F.3d 1461, 1487 (Norris, J., 
dissenting) (discussing “death row phenomenon” or “the protracted incarceration of condemned prisoners under a 
sentence of death in extreme conditions of confinement”); see also Tongue, supra note 3, at 901–2 (description of 
“death row syndrome,” with citations). The locus classicus of a court finding the death penalty impermissible by 
reference to the conditions on death row alone is Soering v. United Kingdom, 11 Eur.Ct.H.R. 439, 478 (1989) 
(holding that while international law does not prohibit the death penalty, the risk of “death row phenomenon” would 
violate the Convention’s Article 3 prohibition on torture or inhuman or degrading treatment).  
46
 Lackey, 514 U.S. at 1046 (if the effect of uncertainty is terrible in a delay of four weeks, delays that “last for many 
years” will be even worse).  
47
 Lloyd Vogelman, et al., Life After Death Row: Post Traumatic Stress and the Story of Philip Takedi, 24 S. AFR. J. 
PSYCH. 91 (1994) (detailing the traumatic effects of spending just 770 days in death row). 
13 
 
this kind of anxiety, is per se cruel and unusual.
48
 And there will always be some delays in an 
execution
49
 (a point I will return to later
50
). 
But this gets us to a second ambiguity about the Lackey claim. It may not be merely the fact 
of delay, and uncertainty, that makes the delay intolerable, but the conditions in which the person 
is confined.
51
 And it is true that conditions on death row are horrible on top of the fact that one is 
waiting—with considerable uncertainty—for one’s death.52 But this strikes me as a point that can 
be addressed on its own, perhaps separated from the delay. It seems, in other words, that we 
could conceptualize awful prison conditions on their own as being in possible violation of the 
Eighth Amendment—if one is in solitary confinement for the duration of one’s life (and one 
knows this) this may amount to cruel and unusual punishment, even when one is not sentenced to 
be executed by the state.
53
 This seems to me not too different than a person on death row who 
experiences the same conditions. It is not that his experience may be worse because of the delay; 
certainly it may be. But there is no reason to think that the conditions by themselves might be 
bad enough to rise to the level of being cruel and unusual. It does not seem to me that it is 
necessary that there be delay and bad conditions to have an Eighth Amendment violation; that 
                                                          
48
 See Kozinzki & Gallagher, supra note 3, at 25 (“These arguments will persuade only those who are already 
convinced.”).  
49
 See State v. Azania, 865 N.E.2d 994, 998–99 decision clarified on reh’g, 875 N.E.2d 701 (Ind. 2007) (listing 
“delay between the commission of the crime and indictment; delay between indictment and arrest; delay between 
arrest and trial; delay between trial and sentencing; delay in processing appeal; delay between appellate court 
decision and subsequent retrial; and delay between appellate court decision and subsequent resentencing 
proceeding.”).  
50
 See infra Part I.C.  
51
 See, e.g., Thompson v. McNeil, 556 U.S. 1114, 115 (2009) (describing “severe conditions of confinement” 
including “spending 23 hours per day in isolation in a 6- by 9-foot cell” and concluding that the “dehumanizing 
effects of such treatment are undeniable”).  
52
 See, e.g., Allen v. Ornoski, 435 F.3d 946 (Lackey claim based on “long tenure on death row under ‘horrific 
conditions’”); id. at 950. 
53
 Davis v. Ayala, 135 S. Ct. 2187, 2208–10 reh’g denied, 136 S. Ct. 14 (2015) (Kennedy, J., concurring)    See also 
George Lombardi, et al., The Management of Death-Sentenced Inmates: Issues, Realities, and Innovative Strategies, 
A Paper Presented at the Annual Meeting of the Academy of Criminal Justice Sciences. Las Vegas, Nevada, Mar. 
1996, https://doc.mo.gov/Documents/DeathSentencedInmates.pdf. 
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there is some alchemy that makes delay plus bad conditions to be only sufficient for being cruel 
and unusual. Whereas my first point suggested that delay on its own might be enough to be cruel 
and unusual, here I suggest something different, but still something that I think diminishes the 
uniqueness of the first variant of the Lackey claim: conditions in many prisons may be awful by 
themselves for any prisoner, not just those waiting on death row. We should prise this objection 
apart from the Lackey claim, I think. 
I find the second type of Lackey claim the more interesting. It could, at least, in principle 
appeal to those who support the death penalty, and who feel it serves some useful purposes. If 
the first Lackey claim can appear to condemn any delay in waiting for the death penalty or to 
focus on something not unique to the death penalty (bad prison conditions), the second type of 
Lackey claim says: there is a time at which the delay in imposition of the death penalty makes the 
death penalty pointless, and so cruel and unusual.
54
 This claim is careful not to say that the death 
penalty always is unjustified, to suggest that any delay may make moot the purposes for which 
death is imposed. It only says that there is a certain point where the delay becomes “too long” 
that death may no longer be warranted. Certainly there is an ambiguity here, but unlike the first 
type of Lackey claim, it is not an ambiguity which seems to cut against imposing the death 
penalty at all.  
In fact, the proponent of the second type of Lackey claim could be a death penalty supporter, 
and lament the fact that there are too many delays in administering the death penalty, to the point 
where the death penalty loses its bite. Justice Rehnquist wrote just such an opinion. In Coleman 
                                                          
54
 This broader claim—about the pointlessness of an execution making it cruel and unusual is present in Justice 
White’s concurrence in Furman: “At the moment that” an execution “ceases realistically to further [the] purposes 
[of punishment], the emerging question is whether its imposition in such circumstances would violate the Eighth 
Amendment. It is my view that it would, for its imposition would then be pointless and needless of life with only 
marginal contributions to any discernible social or public purposes. A penalty with such negligible returns to the 
State would be patently excessive and cruel and unusual punishment violative of the Eighth Amendment.”  
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v. Blakcom, Rehnquist complained that because the Court had introduced so many procedural 
obstacles to the death penalty being imposed, it had made it “virtually impossible for States to 
enforce with reasonable promptness their constitutionally valid capital punishment statutes” 
which “lessen[ed] the deterrent effect of the threat of capital punishment” and “undermine[d] the 
integrity of the entire criminal justice system.”55 Justice Powell expressed a similar concern in an 
article written after he had stepped off the bench.
56
 
I think it is fairly plausible to believe that the longer the delay in executing someone, the less 
deterrent value the mere fact of execution has. It is axiomatic in deterrent theory that the key 
things in making a punishment have a high deterrent value are that the punishment be swift and 
certain.
57
 Delay undermines both of these things. Pushing an execution back further and further 
separates the connection being doing the bad act and suffering a punishment for it. And delay 
makes the punishment uncertain—especially when that delay is not mere dilatoriness, but the 
product of appeals by the defendant, appeals which the defendant may actually win.
58
 Of course, 
it seems to be an open question whether the deterrent value of executing someone after a dozen 
years or more diminishes to zero. Perhaps there is still some minor value to executing someone 
decades after he has committed the crime.
59
 But then we have to ask: is it really necessary to 
cause someone to die in order to achieve that diminished value? And might we also think: we 
                                                          
55
 Coleman v. Balkcom, 451 U.S. 949, 959–60 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).  
56
 Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Commentary, Capital Punishment, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1035, 1041 (1989) (“The retributive 
value of the penalty is diminished as imposition of sentence becomes ever farther removed from the time of the 
offense.”) Powell voted for the death penalty during his tenure on the court.  
57
 CESARE BECCARIA, ON CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS 36 (David Young, trans., Hackett Publ’g Co. 1986) 
(1764). 
58
 E..g, Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S. 990, 998 (1999) (Breyer, J., dissenting from denial of certiori) (observing that 
many of these cases “involve delays which resulted in large part from the States' failure to apply constitutionally 
sufficient procedures at the time of initial sentencing”). 
59
 Stevens says as much in the Lackey memo. Lackey v. Texas, 514 U.S. 1045, 1046 (1995) (“Finally, the additional 
deterrent effect from an actual execution now, on the one hand, as compared to 17 years on death row followed by 
the prisoner's continued incarceration for life, on the other, seems minimal.”). 
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have achieved enough deterrence by giving that person what is in effect a lengthy prison 
sentence? 
I put aside deterrence for most of the rest of this essay because even though I think the best 
theory suggests that the value of deterrence does decline the more delay there is, this is an 
empirical question—and I suppose that people may even stick to their guns and say that even a 
slight deterrence benefit justifies the death penalty. I am more interested in the retributive 
argument here, because it seems more robust and less dependent on empirical evidence.
60
 Either 
one deserves death or not, and while delay may be unfortunate, it does not defeat the point of 
retribution. In fact, I think this claim is correct, but it needs to be spelled out more, something I 
do at length in Part II of this essay. But I need, first, to address two claims about the second 
Lackey argument which will help me clarify the exact type of the argument I am interested in. 
First, does it matter that the prisoner himself might be responsible for the delay? Second, can’t 
we say that the delay in punishment is obviously retributively unjust because the person who is 
ultimately executed will have suffered more than he deserves because he has (a) been on death 
row for many years and in addition to that is (b) executed? Both of these claims have been 
analyzed recently and incisively by Russell Christopher, and I use his essays to help situate my 
interest and my development of the second Lackey argument. The second point, especially, is 
useful in refining the nature of the Lackey claim I will mostly be examining.
61
 
B.  Does it Matter if the Inmate is Responsible for the Delay?62 
                                                          
60
 It has also, as I suggest infra, become the “primary” argument in favor of the death penalty.  
61
 This third Lackey claim exists between the first two I mentioned above. It points to the fact of long delay to show 
that the punishment is unjust given one theory of punishment, viz., retribution.  
62
 My debt to Russell Christopher’s paper on this subject will be obvious to anyone who has read it. Russell 
Christopher, The Irrelevenace of Prisoner Fault For Excessively Delayed Executions, 72 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 3 
(2015).  
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I need here to deal with upfront a key objection to Lackey claims, one that has shown a 
surprising durability in the lower courts.
63
 It is an argument made at length in Justice Thomas’s 
response to Justices Stevens and Breyer,
64
 and it goes like this.
65
 The Lackey claim involves a 
prisoner complaint about delay. But in many cases, that delay is the prisoner’s own fault.66 After 
all, he is the one who is—in most cases-filing appeal after appeal in order to prevent his 
execution from happening, and so is at least in part responsible for the delay he is complaining 
about. It is chutzpah for the prisoner to turn around and complain that it has taken such a long 
time for the state to get around to executing him.
67
 For one, he is surely benefitting from the 
delay that he is getting—he is still alive!68 Second, he could of course in many cases get on with 
it already by dropping his appeals and agreeing to be executed.
69
 There is precedent for that. 
Those on death row get exhausted give up their appeals, and simply submit to their penalties.  
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 See, e.g., Moore v. State, 771 N.E.2d 46, 54 (Ind. 2002) (emphasizing that any delay was caused by defendant, 
and not by the state, either intentionally or unintentionally); accord, Bieghler v. State, 839 N.E.2d 691, 697 (Ind. 
2005). A near comprehensive listing of the lower court cases rejecting Lackey claims on this basis can be found in 
Christopher, supra note 62, 20–31; see also id. at 12 n.45.  
64
 Thompson, 556 U.S. at 1117; Foster, 537 U.S. at 990–91 (Thomas, J., concurring); Johnson v. Bredesen, 558 U.S. 
1067, 1067 (2009) (Thomas, J., concurring). 
65
 As Christopher points out, both Justices Stevens and Breyer—despite approving Lackey claims in principle—do 
not entirely seem to deny the force of Thomas’s argument. Christopher, supra note 62 at 23–28. See, e.g., Lackey, 
514 U.S. at 1047 (“It may be appropriate to distinguish . . . delays resulting from . . . petitioner’s abuse of the 
judicial system by escape or repetitive, frivolous filings”).  
66
 Justice Stevens acknowledged that some of the delay might properly be ignored for this reason. Lackey v. Texas, 
514 U.S. 1045, 1047 (1995) (“It may be appropriate to distinguish, for example, among delays resulting from (a) a 
petitioner's abuse of the judicial system by escape or repetitive, frivolous filings; (b) a petitioner's legitimate exercise 
of his right to review; and (c) negligence or deliberate action by the State. Thus, though English cases indicate that 
the prisoner should not be held responsible for delays occurring in the latter two categories, . . .  it is at least arguable 
that some portion of the time that has elapsed since this petitioner was first sentenced to death in 1978 should be 
excluded from the calculus.”). 
67
 Kozinski & Gallagher, supra note 3 at 25 (“It is somewhat akin to the classic definition of chutzpah for death 
penalty opponents to say we can’t execute someone too fast because he is entitled to a searching review, and then to 
say what we are doing is immoral when we delay the execution precisely to afford such review.”). It puts one in 
mind of the joke in which a person kills his parents then asks the court to have mercy on him because he’s an 
orphan.  
68
 I return to this point in a different context in Part II.  
69
 Foster, 537 U.S. at 471 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“Petitioner could long ago have ended his ‘anxieties and 
uncertainties’ . . . by submitting to what the people of Florida have deemed him to deserve: execution.”).  
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Thomas’ rebuttal to Stevens and Breyer works best, surely, if the appeals made by the 
prisoner are largely frivolous and thus in a real sense simply “buying him time.”70 The argument 
seems less persuasive on its face if the appeals are—as they are at least in the early stages in 
many states—mandatory, or entirely legitimate. If the delay is occasioned by the prisoner 
winning many of his appeals, then the idea that they delay in his penalty is somehow made in 
bad faith seems a little more outrageous. The state should take responsibility for some of the 
delay, at least.
71
 Justice Breyer has made this sort of defense at an even more abstract level, in 
both a legal and an emotional vein. The death row inmate has been given a right to make his 
appeals, and surely the court system cannot fault him for asserting those rights that he has been 
given.
72
 Indeed, on the flip side, Justice Rehnquist lamented the many procedural protections that 
the death row inmate had been given over the years by the Supreme Court
73—but if they are 
there, can the court legitimately fault the prisoner for employing them? More viscerally, can we 
blame someone who is facing his or her death for doing all within their power to avoid that 
                                                          
70
 For example, Thomas’ lament that “a defendant can avail himself of the panoply of appellate and collateral 
procedures and then complain when his execution is delayed” only makes sense if the defendant’s actions are 
assumed to be meritless. Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S. 990, 990 (1999) (Thomas, J. concurring in denial of certiori). 
71
 See, e.g., Ellege, 525 U.S. at 944, 945 (“Not only has he, in prison, faced the threat of death for nearly a 
generation, but he has experienced that delay because of the State’s own faulty procedures.”).  
72
 Society, too, has an interest in making sure the trial is fair and that the right person gets punished. A hasty trial 
may in many cases result in a harm to the state, as well.. See Barker, 407 U.S. at 521 n. 15 (“A requirement of 
unreasonable speed would have a deleterious effect both upon the rights of the accused and upon the ability of 
society to protect itself.”).  
73
 McKenzie v. Day, 57 F.3d 1461 (9th Cir. 1995) (Present death penalty delay “is a consequence of our evolving 
standards of decency, which prompt us to provide death row inmates with ample opportunities to contest their 
convictions and sentences.”) 
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fate?
74
 It is at least understandable, even if the underlying legal claims are not the strongest. They 
may, at least, be worth a try. And a good attorney may be duty bound to try them.
75
  
But Russell Christopher has recently shown why the argument of Justice Thomas’s doesn’t 
work—however persuasive it may be at a rhetorical level. Nor do we need to parse the claims of 
death row litigants to see if their delay is made in good faith or in bad faith. Christopher’s 
argument shows why good or bad faith doesn’t really matter to the ultimate justness of the 
punishment. His rebuttal might be rephrased this way: Even if the resulting punishment after the 
delay is unjust, the fact that the delay that makes the punishment unjust is the prisoner’s fault 
means that, in a sense, he has given up any right to complain about the resulting (unjust) 
punishment. Put this way, the problem with Thomas’s argument becomes more apparent. If a 
punishment is unjust, does it really matter how it became unjust? We may begrudge the prisoner 
who is able to exploit a loophole in order to make it the case that the state can no longer execute 
him justly. But at the end of a day, the state should not be able to pass an unjust punishment, no 
matter how that punishment became unjust.
76
 
To see this, consider a simple hypothetical taken from Christopher’s earlier article.77 The 
state, for whatever reason, agrees to let a prisoner who has been sentenced to death to pick the 
date of his execution. He can choose to get it over with (and let’s say that some do) but he can 
also choose to delay it for up to 30 years. Maybe an inmate wants to be alive while his 
                                                          
74
 Cf. State v. Azania, 865 N.E.2d 994, 1013 (Ind.) decision clarified on reh’g, 875 N.E.2d 701 (Ind. 2007) (Rucker, 
J., dissenting) (noting that the defendant’s goal at the penalty phase is “quite simple: to save his or her life.”)  
75
 The attorney may also hold out the hope that delay will give legislatures and courts time to reconsider whether the 
death penalty should be applied in any case—not just in his client’s. Thanks to Joe Welling and Joe Perkovich for 
this point. 
76
 As Christopher puts it, “there is a gap between the prisoner fault argument addressing delay, and . . . Lackey 
claims and the Eighth Amendment addressing punishment. Who is at fault for the delay does not alter the nature or 
character of the punishment that the prisoner receives.” Christopher, supra note 62, at 13–14.  
77
 Christopher, supra note 62, at 480 (“Suppose a prisoner chose to be drawn and quartered, disemboweled, burned 
at the stake, or tortured by the state. Would the prisoner’s choice preclude these from being cruel and unusual 
punishment?”).  
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grandchildren are born, or maybe he just wants to put off the inevitable as long as he can. Or 
suppose even that some inmates make the choice to put off the execution entirely in bad faith, 
because they believe that they can challenge the punishment as unconstitutional after such a long 
delay (that is, they see picking a late date as providing the ground for a Lackey claim). On this 
hypothetical, the choice is up to the inmate and we can attribute his choice of date to as much 
bad faith as we like. Now, when we get to the date of the punishment and the prisoner balks, by 
saying that the punishment is unjust, we still have to consider his claim. We cannot say that he 
has waived his right to complain because he chose the date (and could have chosen an earlier 
date). When we get to the point of punishing him, the question of the justness of the punishment 
is still there—waiting for us, as it were. 
Christopher makes the point this way: giving the prisoner the choice of punishment does not 
make it the case that he can choose an impermissible punishment.
78
 The argument works both 
with the how of punishment as well as with the when. That is, the argument that “you have been 
sentenced to death, and you can choose being tortured to death or being electrocuted.”79 The fact 
that a prisoner may choose to be tortured to death does not make the punishment not cruel and 
unusual. So too the fact that a prison may choose to delay his execution does not make the 
punishment no cruel and unusual. It may be. That is a separate analysis, quite apart from the fact 
of choice and even the motivation behind the choice. The prisoner cannot waive his right to be 
free from a cruel and unusual punishment. The argument that Thomas makes, while rhetorically 
and superficially appealing, is really a non-starter. 
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 Christopher, supra note 62, at 59 (“[A] defendant’s choice does not transform an unconstitutional punishment into 
a constitutional one.”).  
79
 But as Christopher points out, the Supreme Court, over Justice Stevens dissent, has “opened the door” to the 
constitutionality of this type of choice in the per curiam opinion in Stewart v. LaGrand. Id. at 61–62 (citing Stewart 
v. LaGrand, 526 U.S. 115 (1999) (holding that the defendant’s choosing lethal gas over lethal injection waived his 
right to challenge whether the gas method violated the Eighth Amendment)). 
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C.  A Third Lackey Claim? 
Above, I presented the second type of Lackey claim as saying that delay meant that the 
purposes of execution would no longer be realized by the execution. But I was ambiguous on a 
crucial point. One way of cashing out the claim would be to say that it would be pointless to 
execute someone who is on death row for decades. It would no longer add any deterrent value, 
and it wouldn’t fulfill any retributive purpose, either. But one could read it another way, 
especially concerning the value of retribution being satisfied or not. Maybe it is no longer 
pointless to execute someone who has been languishing on death row, but it would be excessive. 
Consider it this way: the person who is sentenced to execution is sentenced to die; he is not 
sentenced to die plus 20 years in prison. So we might imagine a third type of Lackey claim, viz., 
that the punishment is proportionally unjust, that the person is being punished much more than 
he was sentenced to, and for that reason it is cruel and unusual. It is not claim that retribution 
would be pointless-because the purpose of retribution would no longer be satisfied—but that 
delay plus execution would be wrong because it the person is getting much more than he 
deserves, or at least, much more than what he was sentenced to. If one way of looking at the 
second Lackey claim is that the execution wouldn’t fulfill the goal of retribution, another way of 
looking at it is to say that delay plus execution means that the person is being over-punished, that 
there is too much retribution. As Justice Breyer put it at one point discussing the case of Charles 
Foster, “If executed, Foster, now 55, will have been punished both by death and also by more 
than a generation spent in death row’s twilight.”80 
                                                          
80
 Foster, 537 U.S. at 990 (emphasis added). Another way of phrasing this is to say that the state’s interest in 
retribution ought to have been satisfied by the years in prison and the harsh conditions many face on death row. See, 
e.g., McKenzie, 57 F.3d at 1486 (Norris, J., dissenting) (“This delay, coupled with the allegedly harsh and punitive 
confinement conditions on death row, arguably satisfies the State’s interest in exacting retribution.”). See also 
Lackey, 514 U.S. at 1421 (“Moreover, after such an extended time, the acceptable state interest in retribution has 
arguably been satisfied by the severe punishment already inflicted”). But see infra note 92 for a different 
interpretation of this passage.  
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Russell Christopher pursues this as part of an impressive analytical investigation of what a 
Lackey claim might be.
81
 If the delay that happens before an execution should be construed as 
punishment, and not mere delay (and it seems plausible that it should be), then the person who is 
executed and has to endure 20 years of prison is getting more than they deserve.
82
 That would 
make the punishment disproportional, and thus cruel and unusual.
83
 Now, bracketing that the 
Court has been sparing in its willingness to call sentences disproportionate,
84
 and also bracketing 
the fact that some delay in execution is inevitable
85—an extreme version of Christopher’s claim 
would make it disproportionate punishment if a prisoner was not executed immediately upon 
receiving a sentence of death—I think this type of Lackey claim is less interesting than the one I 
pursue at length in Part II of my paper. The problem comes in thinking about the remedy for 
someone who complains that his new sentence (execution plus delay, rather than just execution) 
is disproportionate, and so retributively unjust.
86
 Maybe the fact that the delay adds to the 
punishment makes the punishment taken as a whole (again, delay plus execution) unjust—but is 
the right, or only, remedy to this that the execution not take place? I take it that the force of a 
Lackey claim is that it means that the remedy is not having the execution—that would be cruel 
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 Christopher, supra note 31, at 453–62 (exploring the argument that delay constitutes additional punishment). 
82
 Judge Fletcher suggests this version of a Lackey claim when he writes (summarizing the trial court judge) that 
“executing Joe Ceja now after 23 years of incarceration on death row is too harsh a punishment for his crimes.” But 
then Fletcher goes on to say that executing him would be pointless, because the reasons for the execution “are no 
longer served by execution.” This latter statement is consistent with the second type of Lackey claim I mentioned, 
above. Ceja v. Stewart, 134 F.3d 1368, 1368–69 (1998) (Fletcher, J., dissenting) (my emphasis). 
83
 E.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 560 (2005) (“[T]he Eighth Amendment guarantees individuals the right 
not to be subjected to excessive sanctions.”). 
84
 E.g., Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 962, 111 S. Ct. 2680, 2683, 115 L. Ed. 2d 836 (1991) (upholding a 
mandatory life without possibility of parole sentence in a drug possession case).  
85
 Coleman v. Balkcom, 451 U.S. 949, 952 (1981) (Stevens, J., concurring in denial of certiori) (“However critical 
one may be of these protracted post-trial procedures, it seems inevitable that there must be a significant period of 
incarceration on death row during the interval between sentencing and execution.”). But Stevens goes on to note that 
when the delay is “for a prolonged period, the imprisonment during that period is nevertheless a significant form of 
punishment.” Id. 
86
 See Dan Markel, Chad Flanders & David C. Gray, Beyond Experience: Getting Retributive Justice Right, 99 
CALIF. L. REV. 605, 608 (2011) (discussing retributive proportionality). 
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and unusual, because it would be too much punishment. But can this third kind of Lackey claim 
get us that result? 
 Consider what I take to be a similar (or similar enough) claim. A person is sentenced to 
five years in prison. However, in the third year of his sentence, he is badly beaten by a prison 
guard. He sues, and asks that his prison sentence be reduced, because if he were to serve his full 
sentence, he will have been punished too much—he will have been beaten badly and had to serve 
his full punishment. There are certainly some complicated questions here about remedies, but I 
believe my point here can bypass at least some of them. One complication is whether the beating 
by the prison guard should be considered punishment at all—such that we can tradeoff one 
aspect of the prisoner’s punishment with it. But let us stipulate that the beating is an additional 
punishment. Does it follow that the right remedy to the fact of the beating is to reduce the term of 
years the prisoner is facing? Are the punishments—stipulating, again, that they are both 
punishments—commensurable in that way? Not necessarily. We could look at them on different 
vectors. We might say that the prisoner didn’t deserve to be beaten, and we could give him 
money damages to represent that fact. But we might still hold on to the fact that prisoner still 
deserves his five years in prison because of the crime he committed. We might say, in this vein, 
that the punishments are to a certain extent incommensurable. Getting an additional unjustified 
punishment of one type does not mean that you should automatically get less of another, justified 
punishment.
87
 As one court has put it, “When prisoners complain about the conditions in prison, 
we do not commute their sentence; we order the conditions ameliorated. If inordinate delay in 
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 Cf. Alexander A. Reinert, Release as Remedy for Excessive Punishment, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1575 (2011–
2012) (arguing for release as a remedy to unconstitutional punishment). But see id. at 1637 (noting early release as a 
remedy “has never been seriously considered by courts or advocates”).  
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carrying out an execution is adjudge to be a problem of constitutional dimension there may be 
other remedies that are more appropriate in addressing the harm done.”88  
If it is not obvious in that example that the punishments are incommensurable, things get 
considerably clearer, I think, when we move to term of years sentences as opposed to a sentence 
of death.
89
 If one is sentenced to death, then (I will have more to say about this later), then the 
judgment is of the sort: “you deserve to die.” Can any amount of years add up to an equivalent 
punishment? I do not think so. Death is different, and qualitatively so.
90
 No amount of some 
other punishment can add up to a punishment of death. In other words, death as a punishment 
and a term of years as punishment are incommensurable. We cannot satisfy a sentence of death 
with a long sentence of a term of years.  
Why does this matter? It matters, first, because it may be that even if a person is sentenced, 
unjustifiably, to a term of years in prison plus a death sentence, he still deserves to die for all 
that. It is not as if the death sentence becomes unjustified because of that sentence to a certain 
amount of years. The death sentence would still be retributively justified; the person has still 
been condemned to death. For the retributivist, the person deserved to die and so he should die. 
To offer not executing the person as a sort of remedy would lead to something retributively 
unjust—it would mean the person not getting what he deserved. And in so doing, we would 
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 McKenzie, v. Day, 57 F.3d 1461, 1467 (9th Cir., 1995).  
89
 It is on this point, I think, that I most differ from and depart from Christopher’s analysis. I think that the 
retributivist may hold that death is still deserved, even if there is added to it some amount of undeserved additional 
punishment. The question then becomes whether it is disproportionate to keep a person alive when he deserves to 
die now, or whether it is in fact a benefit to the person to stay alive just a little bit longer.  
90
 This is usually applied in the context of “death is final, whereas other punishments are not, so we need to add 
extra due process protections in order to make sure we get it right.” See, e.g., Woodson v. N. Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 
305 (1976) (“Death, in its finality, differs more from life imprisonment than a 100-year prison term differs from one 
of only a year or two.”); Jones, 31 F. Supp.3d at 1061. But it seems to me equally applicable in the context of “death 
in its severity and finality is utterly unlike any punishment which involves the person still living.” Kant, of course, 
famously insisted on this point (as against Beccaria): “There is no similarity between life . . . and death, hence no 
likeness between the crime and the retribution unless death is judicially carried out upon the wrongdoer.” KANT, 
THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 142 (1991). 
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replace one sort of injustice—giving a person years in prison plus what he deserves—with 
another—not giving the person what he deserves. (Either way we lose.91) The conclusion here 
has to be something like that it is not the case that the state’s interest in execution can be satisfied 
by any additional amount of years. Death and years in prison are fundamentally different 
punishments. 
92
 We have to look elsewhere for a remedy, if such a remedy is to be had. One 
thing seems clear: the fact of the extra years in prison in itself can’t be used as a substitute for an 
execution, if that is what the person deserves.  
But maybe that is not the point. Maybe the point is that the state cannot give out cruel and 
unusual punishments. The Constitution does not require that sentences be just; it mandates that 
they not be unjust. A disproportionate punishment is cruel and unusual, and so the state can’t do 
it. If the only remedy to the punishment becoming cruel and unusual is not to execute, then the 
person can’t be executed.93 The third Lackey claim would push execution off the table as 
permissible punishment, because it would literally be overkill. Maybe it would mean that the 
person was not punished as much as he deserved, but again—the Constitution prohibits the 
disproportionately harsh punishment, and does not guarantee a punishment that is not 
disproportionately lenient. 
Here, then, we get to the crux of the matter, and to my rejoinder. The problem with the third 
Lackey claim, and one which may doom it, is that it is not obvious that delay is a bad thing for 
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which the prisoner needs a remedy—such as money or forgoing the execution altogether. The 
time the person is still in prison is time that he is still alive, maybe living under horrible 
conditions, but living all the same. Here again the notion of punishment incommensurability is 
relevant.
94
 If nothing is as bad as death, nothing is as bad as death—not even an extended stay in 
prison. The years of delay are years that the inmate is not dead. Here the difference between 
extra years in prison (however many) is different from a sentence to death. Being in prison 
longer would be a bizarre remedy for bad treatment in prison, or even being mistakenly 
sentenced to more years in prison than you deserved. But it is plausible at some level to see a 
longer prison term as a good thing—even a sort of remedy—if the alternative is death.95  
Now it does seem a relevant data point that many prisoners choose to file appeals in part to 
extend their stays in prison rather than be put to death. Not that this delay can make the resulting 
punishment just; we saw that it cannot. But it may show that it may be better for the inmate to 
live longer than to live shorter; that it is better all things considered, that the inmate be alive than 
that he be dead. It goes to the question of whether years in prison plus execution is really 
disproportionate in the same way that years in prison plus a beating would be disproportionate. 
It may be that living longer is a benefit to the inmate, or at the least not obviously a further 
injustice, rather than an additional punishment, one that needs to be remedied. It seems to me 
plausible to think that being a live in prison is better than death, based on the fact that death is so 
different than other punishment—so different that it can make prison seem a comparatively 
better deal. If this is right, then the idea that the punishment is disproportionate is a non-starter. 
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 As I examine in Part II.B below, the intrinsic desert retributivist will insist that each day the person who deserves 
to die is left to live this is a bad thing—allowing an unjust state of affairs to persist.  
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This does not mean that the execution plus the delay, however, may not be cruel and unusual in 
some other way; only that it is not cruel and unusual because it is disproportionate.
96
  
Thus, for the rest of the paper, I am more interested in the idea that execution may be 
pointless because the purpose of retribution is no longer served after a long delay, not that the 
execution may be disproportional. If a too long delayed execution is pointless, because it serves 
no deterrent or retributive function, the execution is cruel and unusual, and it doesn’t matter why 
the delay happened. Nor is the proper remedy for the delay an issue. If the execution really has 
no point, then it shouldn’t happen, because to do so would be cruel and unusual—it is not a 
question of removing the execution because having it would make the punishment 
disproportional. And the pointlessness of an execution should matter to even those who favor the 
death penalty. Presumably, they favor the death penalty because it serves some purpose. If it no 
longer did, then they should oppose it. Otherwise, they are left simply will a form of bloodlust—
killing for no reason than for killing.  
This is different than the third Lackey claim just discussed. Those who believed that the death 
penalty was still deserved, even though execution would make the punishment disproportionate, 
might think it tragic that the only solution to an Eighth Amendment violation was nixing the 
execution. They would still see the inmate as deserving death. If delay made it the case that 
retribution no longer made sense—that the purpose of retribution would no longer be served—
then maybe those who favor the death penalty would lament the fact that the death penalty was 
once justified, but no longer is. But they could not still see the death penalty as justified, or at 
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not be disproportionate—and so cruel and unusual—and would still at least satisfy the requirement that the person 
who deserves the death penalty must die.  
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least fully justified, now. So I think this version of the Lackey claim is the most interesting. In 
order to fully understand it, though, we have to know more about what retribution might be. 
III.  Two Versions of Retribution  
My narrow interest in the Lackey claim, then, comes down to the version which says that 
executing a person after a long delay makes the execution pointless. And narrowing things even 
further, I am interested in the version of the Lackey claim that says that the retributive purpose of 
an execution would no longer be served after a long delay. Elaborating on this version of a 
Lackey claim requires us to say what exactly retribution is, so that we can figure out when 
punishment serves a retributive purpose and when it does not. There are many varieties of 
retributivism; some rather baroque in their complexity.
 97
 But the Supreme Court has made our 
task here somewhat easier, because over the years it has described retribution as a purpose of 
punishment, and in so doing has articulating some assumptions about retribution is. As far as I 
can tell, there are two broad kinds of retribution that the Court talks about when it talks about 
retribution. 
98
 The first version focuses on punishment’s ability to satisfy community outrage. 
Call this the outrage version of retribution. Crime makes us mad, and the point of punishment is 
to satisfy this outrage. This is a crude sketch (although I will eventually make the case that this is 
a rather crude version of retribution), but it pops up regularly in the Court’s discussion of 
retribution. The second version of retribution focuses on the offender’s desert.99 On this version 
retribution requires that bad people be punished for the bad things they have done. At the 
extreme, people who have killed other people may deserve to die. Retribution is not about 
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pleasing the community, or satisfying their outrage, but about meting out justice, giving people 
what they—because of their bad acts—deserve. Call this intrinsic desert retribution.  
I spend the rest of this Part running the Lackey claim about the pointlessness of executing 
someone after a delay with these two versions of retribution. I will also elaborate these two kinds 
of retribution and, when I think it makes sense, criticize them. The general arc of my argument is 
that the Lackey claim works well under the community outrage theory of retribution. But 
community outrage retribution is a bad theory of retribution. The intrinsic desert theory of 
retribution is much better philosophically speaking. But the Lackey claim doesn’t work with it—
in fact, it shows the limits of the Lackey claim: if we understand retribution in the most plausible 
way, the Lackey claim doesn’t go through, except in one rare (and telling) case. The best thing to 
do in this case is to question whether the state can ever legitimately embrace intrinsic desert 
retribution as a purpose of punishment. I develop the argument that it cannot in Part III.  
A.  Community Outrage Retribution 
In writing about why Lackey claims might work, Justice Breyer most clearly attaches it to a 
community outrage version of retribution. 
100
 In his recent dissent in Valle v. Florida, this comes 
out clearly. “I would ask how often [the] community’s sense of retribution would forcefully 
insist [on] a death that comes only several decades after the crime was committed.”101 The 
argument is fairly straightforward.
102
 If punishment, including the execution of an inmate, is 
about satisfying community outrage, then it stands to reason that the community may become 
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less mad over time. Its anger may diminish, to the point even of indifference. Suppose someone 
commits a horrible crime. There is pressure by the community to find the person and to punish 
him. The police find him, he goes to trial, and is sentenced to death. The community gradually 
forgets about him, and goes about its business.
103
 Maybe some still remember: the family of the 
victim, the prosecutor.
104
 But even their anger is considerably diminished. Ten years pass; now 
twenty. His appeals exhausted, the person now gets a notice that he will be put to death soon. 
There is a brief flurry of news coverage; some protestors make last ditch pleas to the governor 
for commutation. Compared to the initial uproar at the time of the commission of the crime, the 
community interest, let alone outrage, is muted, and practically non-existent. It has run itself 
out.
105
 What, we might ask, is the point of executing the person anymore? Or is it not more 
plausible to think that the retributive justification “dimish[es] as the delay lengthens”?106 Maybe 
he’s suffered enough; maybe the community is happy enough just to let the person languish in 
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 See Valle, 132 S. Ct. at 3 (“I would ask how often that community’s sense of retribution would forcefully insist 
upon a death that comes only several decades after the crime was committed”).  
106
 Johnson v. Bredesen, 130 S.Ct 541, 543 (2009) (majority opinion).  
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prison until he dies. Is it really necessary to go ahead and kill the inmate? As Judge Fletcher has 
written, the community outrage version of retribution seeks to “secure some form of moral and 
emotional closure to the community.”107 But what if the community has already “secure[d]” this 
closure prior to the death penalty? Or what if such closer is now impossible or at least 
“grievously undermined”?108  
So goes the argument against executing someone after a delay—it would no longer serve any 
retributive function, on the theory that if retribution is meant to slake community outrage, that 
outrage may—after a long enough time—no longer need to be slaked. When the Court articulates 
this theory, it is clear that it does not want to equate community outrage with a brute desire for 
revenge. Indeed, in a contrast that we will have occasion to revisit (in Part III), the court insists 
that using punishment as a vehicle of community outrage, the goal is precisely to prevent the 
community breaking out into a vendetta against the accused.
109
 Suppose there is a terrible crime, 
but the state does nothing to investigate or put on trial or to punish the person who is suspected 
of doing it. In this case, seeing the state fail to act, the community will take the law into its own 
hands. It will seek out the suspect—or the family of the suspect, or the suspects compatriots, or 
all of them—and enforce a punishment itself. This is a consequence the state wants to avoid; the 
state wants to remove revenge from the equation and put itself between the accused and the 
community. It wants to stand in for the community, and be the relatively more restrained version 
of the community’s desire to see justice done. It acts to keep the punishment within bounds, to 
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 State v. Santiago, 122 A.3d 1, 64 reconsideration denied, 124 A.3d 496 (Conn. 2015) (“What is clear, however, 
is that the most tangible retributive fruit of capital punishment—providing victims and their families with a sense of 
respite, empowerment, and closure—is grievously undermined by the interminable delays in carrying out the 
sentence imposed.”); Nichols v. Heidle, 725 F.3d 516, 559 (6th Cir., 2013) (Martin, J, concurring) (delay means 
providing “no closure for families of the victims”).  
109
 “When people begin to believe that organized society is unwilling or unable to impose upon criminal offenders 
the punishment they ‘deserve,’ then there are sown the seeds of anarchy-of self-help, vigilant justice, and lynch 
law.” Furman, 408 U.S. at 380 (Stewart, J., concurring).  
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make sure the suspect is treated fairly, and not arbitrarily. In other words, the punishment (even 
and up to an execution) channels the anger and hatred of the community. It channels it into 
something more appropriate, something at least approximating justice. The role of the state here 
is precisely to recognize community outrage and its deep basis in human nature, but also to limit 
and constrain it, so that things do not get out of hand.  
The Lackey argument however also has its basis in human nature. Someone does us a wrong. 
We are angry, for a time.
110
 We may even exact some punishment. But anger and hatred fade. 
Sometimes they mature into forgiveness, as we are ready to look at the person who has harmed 
us in a new light, one not irredeemably tainted by the wrong he has done. Sometimes this 
happens. What usually happens, though, is that time passes and we forget. We just no longer feel 
the same things about the person that we did, especially if we are not in continual contact with 
that person. We move on with our lives. But if this is true of our sentiments, and if the reason we 
punish is that we need our feelings to be satisfied, validated, what happens when those feelings 
change? What happens when we are no longer outraged?
111
 Maybe, in the case of criminal 
justice, we keep the person in prison for reasons of incapacitation or deterrence, but the original 
reason, the reason that made us so in need of seeing this person punished or even to suffer is 
gone. Now, is it implausible to think that this may happen in the case of the death penalty? We 
start out very angry; we want to see this person not just punished but punished in the worst way 
possible—we want to see him or her dead. The person is placed in death row, and then ten years 
pass; then twenty, or more. The anger is replaced with some sort of rough reconciliation with the 
facts of what has happened, or in any case the anger is no longer red hot. What then is the 
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purpose of going on with the execution? Maybe our anger has been satisfied by the person 
languishing on death row and so we don’t see the need for any more punishment. Maybe it is 
enough that the person die on death row, but we may not feel the need to see him executed 
anymore. In either case, the need to mete out the ultimate punishment (death) doesn’t have the 
same force it did. The execution seems now an empty ritual—a promise we made a long time 
ago, and which now we no longer may feel is worth fulfilling.  
The force of this argument depends crucially on getting what we mean by retribution right, 
and finding that version of retribution plausible and palatable. Is it? I think there are a few 
problems.
112
 First, we have to analyze whether this version of retribution is getting what we are 
feeling right when we are feeling angry about punishing someone. What do we want? The 
community outrage version of retribution, the one relied on by some of the Lackey claim 
proponents seems to say something like: the reason we punish is that we want to see our anger 
expressed and by punishment, satisfied.
 113
 We want to see that a person is punished so that we 
are ourselves sated.
114
 The state, on this picture, of retribution also sees punishment in this light. 
If the state does not punish, then the community’s outrage might get out of control; it may see 
itself having to deal with angry citizens trying to take the law into their own hands. In short, the 
community outrage sees the point of punishment as taming or satisfying or channeling the 
community’s potentially volatile emotions. Punishment bottoms out in subjective feelings, not in 
anything objective, at least if community outrage is what we are focusing on. This view at least 
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has the virtue of understanding why time matters in executing someone. The longer we wait, the 
better the chances that our feelings will have changed, or gone away altogether.
115
  
But it is debatable that community outrage retribution gets right what are actually feeling 
when we feel anger or hatred about someone who has done us wrong. Certainly we have 
emotions, and we may feel better when something is done to appease those emotions. But we are 
also making a judgment, at least implicitly—aren’t we?116 We are saying that the person who has 
done us wrong deserves to suffer, or even that it would be good or fitting that the person suffer 
for what he has done.
117
 Our emotions aren’t just raw feelings, which need to be dealt with 
(although they are surely that) they are also implicitly claims about what should happen. The 
point of punishment is not merely to channel those emotions but in some sense to vindicate them, 
or more properly to vindicate the judgment embodied in them.
118
 The community outrage version 
of retribution sells our emotions short. It treats those emotions as ends in themselves, when they 
are in fact much more than that, even nobler than that. They have a reason to them—maybe a 
reason we only see dimly ourselves—but a reason nonetheless.  
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To see how this is so, consider how if the community outrage theory of retribution is right, 
the Lackey claim may still not work. It is certainly at least an empirical question as to whether 
our outrage really will fade after many years. Isn’t it possible that a community could, after many 
years, still gather up the anger and hatred against a person who has committed a vicious crime? 
Maybe the community remembers ever year the date the crime was committed, and its anger far 
from fading seems to grow ever hotter as the person is still not executed. Or maybe the 
community does tend to forget, but then the anger again is renewed as it looks like the person 
finally will be executed; people are reminded again how much that person has harmed the 
community. On these scenarios, the Lackey claim wouldn’t work: “You thought that our outrage 
would disappear, but look it hasn’t—it was there all along, albeit slightly below the surface. We 
still demand that you heed our feelings, and execute this person.” If the community outrage 
version of retribution is right, then the success or failure of the Lackey claim just depends. It 
depends on whether we are still outraged, or whether we can gather up that outrage again. If we 
are still outraged, then maybe we do need to punish the person by execution, even many, many 
years after the crime was committed.  
The community outrage version of retribution also has problems, if considered as a general 
theory of punishment. Suppose someone kills a particularly disfavored member of the 
community; there is no outrage. Does it follow the person shouldn’t be punished? If we are 
retributivists, this seems an unpalatable result—it seems to make retribution depend on 
contingent judgments of a person’s value to the community, which at times could come to see 
arbitrary. And this again is the problem with looking at the main thing as being the community’s 
outrage itself, rather than the judgment that outrage may contain. If the main thing is the 
judgment, then we can sometimes say to the community, “A horrible crime has been committed 
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here, which we should all see as a horrible crime that deserves punishment, we really should feel 
outraged!” If all that matters is the feelings of the community, then we can’t say this, maybe we 
can try to stoke outrage, but we cannot criticize the community for not feeling outrage—it feels 
what it feels.
119
 I don’t think this “outrage” version of retribution captures what we are actually 
feeling, and it does not get at what is appealing about retribution. Retribution is about a judgment 
about what people deserve, not a statement about what the community feels. If it was just about 
community feeling, then the answer to crime might not need to be punishment, but something 
that distracted the community from its feelings, to make those feelings fade and for the 
community to forget about the terrible thing that has been done.
120
 Punishment drops out as 
essentially related to crime; crime just demands that people’s emotions be managed in some way 
or another, not that crime be punished. The necessary link between an offender’s crime and an 
offender’s punishment isn’t there on the community outrage version of retribution. It’s just not a 
plausible theory of punishment, even if sometimes as a contingent matter, it may make sense of 
some Lackey claims. I suggest we look elsewhere. 
B.  Intrinsic Desert Retribution 
Fortunately, there is an alternative to community outrage retributivism, and it is better, 
philosophically than that version. This version—which I’ll call intrinsic desert retributivism—
takes seriously the judgment at the bottom of the community’s judgment of the person who has 
committed the crime. The point of punishment, the intrinsic desert retributivist says, is that the 
person get what he or she deserves. If the person is not punished as much as desert says they 
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should be punished, or is punished less, then retribution has not been satisfied—no matter what 
the community thinks. If the community thinks a person should be executed, but his crime 
doesn’t merit that, then the person shouldn’t be executed, even if it means that the community 
will take the law into its own hands
121
. Kant is probably the paradigm of a intrinsic desert 
theorist. He famously said that even if an island was about to disband, and a person still needed 
to be executed, then the island as possibly its very last act, should kill that person. That person 
deserved to die. Even if the community had forgotten about that person, because he had been 
languishing on death row; even if the community has better things to do, the community ought to 
go ahead with the execution. To do so would be an injustice—it would be wrong. It would be 
wrong because the person because of his crime deserved the punishment. Failure to give him his 
punishment—to give him what he deserved—would be a sin against justice. Justice stands apart 
from what we feel, and what we happen to be concerned about at the moment. It has its own 
logic and its own demands, which we might hope that community sentiment would track, but if it 
doesn’t, then so much the worse for community sentiment. As the Court affirmed in Gregg, 
“[t]he truth is that some crimes are so outrageous that society insists on adequate punishment, 
because the wrong-doer deserves it.”122 
 But this version of retribution, even though it may be more philosophically appealing, 
may not offer much support for a Lackey claim. If a person deserves to die, then he deserves to 
die, and no amount of delay is really relevant to that. It may be the case that it is better if the 
person is executed sooner rather than later. Patrick Tomlin has recently advanced this sort of 
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argument, in the context of retribution more generally.
123
 For intrinsic desert retribution, each 
day a person is not given what he deserves, the time is out of joint—the universe is 
unbalanced.
124
 It is bad when people do not get what they deserve, and so we should consider it 
somewhat pressing that we do give them what they deserve. Delay in executing someone who 
deserves death is a delay in justice being done. It is not clear to me that this injustice aggregates 
over time: is each passing day an additional justice, or is it the same injustice as it was before? It 
may be that each passing day of delay makes the victims of the crime all the more aggrieved or 
the community more angry, but it is not clear that each day of delay an additional injustice is 
being done to them
125—or to the inmate who also is not getting his “just deserts.” But even if the 
injustice increases or whether it stays the same during a long delay, one point is clear: the person 
still deserves to die. Even though it might be better (even better from the standpoint of justice) 
that the person be executed sooner rather than later, this doesn’t change the fact that the person 
sentenced to die really deserves to die at some time. As one court has said, “Insofar as ‘just 
deserts’ theory holds certain murderers do not deserve a fate better than that inflicted on their 
victims, the passage of time and alteration of circumstances have no bearing on this retributive 
imperative.”126 
But there may be two ways in which even intrinsic desert retributivism may give some 
legitimacy to a Lackey claim. I deal with one of those ways briefly now, and the second one I 
deal with at length in the next section, because it will provide the basis for a much longer 
                                                          
123
 Patrick Tomlin, Time and Retribution, 33 LAW & PHIL. 655, 662 (2014) (retributivists should “prefer the guilty to 
be punished quickly”). I don’t claim to capture Tomlin’s argument in all its sophistication here, and in fact I agree 
with much of it.  
124
 As Tomlin phrases it at one point, we might think “whilst we are waiting for a deserved punishment to be 
delivered . . . this is a bad state of affairs, since there is a retributive injustice which is yet to be rectified. The longer 
this state of affairs persists, the worse things are.” Id. at 671.  
125
 See id..  
126
 People v. Ochoa, 28 P.3d 78, 1115 (Ca. 2001). 
39 
 
discussion in Part III about whether intrinsic desert retribution could ever be a proper purpose for 
the state to pursue. In other words, the upshot of my argument in this part and the next will be 
that even if the best version of retribution prevents a Lackey claim from going through, the best 
version of retribution may not be suitable as a goal for the state to advance. Before we get to that, 
however, I want to consider a not implausible way in which we may think that delay matters to 
someone deserving a punishment or another. 
 Suppose it were possible that a person while he is awaiting execution could have his 
desert status changed. Maybe he has undergone a religious conversion, and now repents of his 
former ways. Or maybe he has just undergone a gradual process of reform, so that now he is in 
some real sense a different person. Or perhaps the passage of time has disconnected him, 
psychologically from his crime.
127
 Is it now fair to say that this person, the person who twenty 
years later has changed so much really is the person who committed the crime, really now 
deserves to die? Breyer, at least in passing, has suggested this possibility.
128
 In context, he may 
be tying it to a community outrage version of retribution. The person has changed, so we are no 
longer as mad at him as we used to be—we can’t be, because “he” is not the same person he was. 
But we can also run the “change in identity” theory through an intrinsic desert retribution lens. 
The person has changed, and so we can say that this person now no longer deserves to be 
executed.
129
 It follows, then, that intrinsic retribution would not be satisfied after such a long 
delay, and where such a change has happened. We could win a Lackey claim under such a 
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theory.
130
 Executing a person who is no longer the same person is pointless; it is not justified by 
intrinsic retribution, so going ahead with the execution would be cruel and unusual.  
The personal identity theory that this claim requires is interesting, but not obviously right, 
either as a metaphysical matter or as a matter of describing how our criminal justice system 
operates. I put my focus mainly on the latter point. It is true that we reconsider sentences—we 
may think that someone is eligible for early release, based on that person having rehabilitated 
him- or herself. Sometimes this can be phrased in terms of desert: the person no longer 
“deserves” to be in jail. But I wonder if the determination in these cases for other reasons, 
compatible with saying that the person is still getting what she deserves. An early release 
determination could simply mean that the person no longer needs to be locked up because she is 
no longer a danger to the community. Or maybe the “second look” at the sentence reveals that 
the sentence was in some sense originally retributively wrong.
131
 The initial sentence was too 
harsh, which we now see—we thought the defendant wasn’t remorseful, but he was, or maybe 
some new evidence shows a diminished responsibility for the crime. Both of these things are 
compatible with saying that the retributive purpose of the punishment has still been served, even 
if the person is released early. If a person is sentenced to death for reasons of safety rather than 
for reasons of deserve, then of course commuting the death penalty would be consistent with—
and perhaps even demanded by retribution. And if new evidence demonstrated that the person 
did not commit the crime or was not as big a participant in the crime as was originally thought, 
then intrinsic desert retribution would be perfectly fine with changing the punishment, including 
changing the punishment from death to a prison sentence. 
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I think our criminal justice system operates for the most part on the idea that we can judge 
people for a bad act and give them a punishment that they must fulfill, in order for retribution to 
be satisfied. The criminal justice system does not normally believe that people change and so we 
must accordingly continually calibrate punishments accordingly, in case a person’s identity 
changes. The default is instead that the person should stay in prison for his or her entire sentence, 
subject to some exceptions.
132
 In other words, the picture of personal identity generally in place 
in our criminal justice system does not buy into the “change in identity” theory. At the extreme a 
person who goes insane may not be executed.
133
 But we do this not because the person has 
changed, so he is not the same person; we do not do it because it would be cruel. Our criminal 
justice system is more than happy to condemn a person for the rest of his life—even to his 
death—for something bad he did as an adult. If we except juveniles from this, as we do, it is 
because we are not really sure that the act of the child demonstrated a fully responsible act, so 
that we wonder if the juvenile really deserves to be condemned for the rest of his life for 
something he did as a child.
134
 Adults do not get such an out. They are made to suffer for the rest 
of their lives, even if they are exemplary prisoners, show remorse, do good deeds for the outside 
world. We stick people with their past deeds in our criminal justice system, to the point that they 
can in some sense, never really shake them from their identity. So it does not seem as if our 
criminal justice system is ready to buy into the theory of identity that this version of the Lackey 
claim needs to work. Our criminal justice system is perfectly fine with sentencing someone 
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based on his or her culpability at the time of the offense committed.
135
 Of course, things could 
change—but it does not seem as they will anytime soon.  
C.  Dying in Prison 
I have not yet remarked upon one of the more important facts about the death penalty today, 
which is that most of those on death row, a great majority of them, are never actually executed. It 
is not because they are pardoned, or win their appeals. Instead, they die in prison.
136
 Thus, many 
have said, rightly, that if you are sentenced to death, it is more likely that you will die in prison 
than you will actually be executed by the state and that “for all practical purposes .... a sentence 
of death in California is a sentence of life imprisonment with the remote possibility of death.”137 
Now, this fact should trouble those who believe in intrinsic desert retribution. If long delays in 
the imposition of the death penalty mean that people are dying in prison instead of being 
executed, then they are not getting what they deserve.
138
 They are cheating their punishment, in 
the same way as if, moments before their execution, they had run away—only to be eaten by a 
wild animal. There is a presupposition that becomes evident in making this point, a 
presupposition that I believe is essential to intrinsic desert retribution: those who do bad things 
do not merely deserve bad things to happen to them, which they suffer in some way. Rather, 
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those who do bad things deserve punishment.
139
 The intrinsic desert retribution theory, if it is to 
be taken as a theory of state punishment, and not just a sort of a metaphysical theory about good 
and evil, needs to have something like this presupposition. A person who commits a crime as it is 
defined by the state, and in doing so offends the state and its citizens, deserves to be punished at 
the hands of the state and not just to have someone hurt him or have bad things befall him. There 
needs to be a kind of symmetry in the offense, which is against the state, and the nature of the 
punishment, which is exacted by the state. 
This is a point that I think many have missed.
140
 But an example will help show the point. 
Suppose a person has committed a bank robbery, and is able to escape. During the escape he is 
badly injured, and briefly himself kidnapped and held by a stranger—unable to leave, and given 
very little to eat. Eventually, the bank robber is captured, tried, and found guilty. Can the bank 
robber at his sentencing hearing appeal to the fact that he was injured or kidnapped after he 
committed his crime. Can he appeal to the mercy of the judge and say, “Your honor, certainly I 
have already suffered enough. Put aside my very bad leg injury, which I thought was God’s way 
of telling me I had done something wrong. But the kidnapping was the worst. I have already 
known the horrors of being deprived of my freedom. Please show leniency on me.”141 It seems 
that the judge could reply, in turn: “I feel sorry for you, certainly. But your crime means that you 
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have a debt to pay to society. And our laws say that for your crime, you must spend three years 
in prison, and so that is what you will get.” Maybe the judge could show some mercy, but she 
need not; she could stick to the prescribed sentence on the books; she need not, in other words, 
take the bank robber’s previous suffering at all into account. Why should she? Here again we 
have to return to the fact of incommensurability. Above, we discussed how it may be that 
spending time in prison could not be traded off with death. A prisoner could not say, “It is 
enough that I have suffered this many years in prison; it is not fair now that you, in addition, 
execute me.” Now we face a different kind of incommensurability—the incommensurability of 
suffering and punishment. What the bank robber owes to society in the form of punishment is not 
something that can be paid in terms of other suffering—he could not self-flagellate in order to 
reduce the number of years he might be sentenced. He must actually pay the debt he owes to 
society in the form of a punishment imposed on him by society. You can’t pay that debt with 
some other sort of suffering that you happen to have undergone.  
 We need to tie this back to the Lackey issue, and say why it matters. On the theory of 
intrinsic retribution, a person deserves to be punished, and it is a failure of justice if that person is 
not punished. If a person deserves to die as a result of what he has done, he deserves to die, and 
no amount of other suffering will do. But maybe we can make a Lackey claim along the 
following lines. Suppose an inmate has been sentenced to death, but due to appeals and just the 
inherently slow nature of the machinery of justice, the delay lasts years, decades. He is now on 
his deathbed, just barely alive and moments away from death. However, it is also at this moment 
that his appeals have been exhausted and the state says he must be put to death. Can his attorney 
argue that execution at this point is pointless? He is about to die anyway, under the watchful eye 
of the state—and what the state wants to do would at most cut his life off by a matter of minutes. 
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Here, if anywhere, the Lackey argument that the execution would be pointless seems to have 
some real bite. What possible state interest could be satisfied by taking a dying man on his death 
bed and hooking him up to be executed? We might say that the punishment that the person has 
gotten to that point is good enough or at least close enough to satisfy any interest the state has, 
even in intrinsic retribution. Let the person die naturally; it would not be serving any purpose of 
punishment to instead have the person be executed.  
But here the intrinsic desert retributivist may instead dig in his heels.
142
 If we buy that 
intrinsic desert means that the person does not simply deserve to suffer some bad thing, but to 
actually suffer punishment and punishment at the hands of the state, a natural death and a death 
by execution cannot be traded off with one another. If the sentence is one of death by the state—
by means of execution—then the person who instead dies in prison of natural causes is not 
getting what he deserves. He is, in a way, cheating his punishment. Maybe the intrinsic desert 
retributivist will not go ahead with the execution for reasons of mercy or sympathy—but in these 
cases, there would be values that would outweigh the value of just punishment; they would not 
show that the retribution in itself would be pointless.
143
 The fact of the matter would still be that 
the person deserves to be put to death, and that not executing would be a failure of desert. A 
Lackey claim under these circumstances would fail, at least if we believe that the purpose of 
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retribution is to give people what they deserve, because the person still should be executed, even 
if he is shortly to die anyway. The only way a Lackey claim would work if the person had died 
already by natural causes—then it really would be pointless to execute him. But for obvious 
reasons, no one would make this type of claim.
144
 I conclude, then, that on the best version of 
retributive theory—the intrinsic desert theory—delay cannot render an execution pointless if the 
inmate deserves death. Indeed, delay even up to the very moment before death, does not remove 
the retributive value of executing the person.  
IV. Is Retribution a Legitimate State Purpose? 
If we stick with intrinsic desert retribution, it is hard to see that a delay execution, while it 
may not be all that desirable—it would be better if justice were done sooner rather than later—it 
would not be pointless. If justice demands that a person be executed by the state, then that person 
should be executed, because he deserves to die. Even if the person is on his deathbed, and will 
die anyway, he should still be killed because his sentence was not to die in prison, but to suffer 
execution at the hands of the state. In a way, this implication of the intrinsic desert retributivist’s 
position should not be surprising. It is simply something entailed by Kant’s position.145 Kant said 
we should give the death penalty to a person who deserved it even if the community was 
disbanding the next day.
146
 There was no point to his execution—no gratification of people’s 
emotions (they had other things on their mind), no need to prevent revenge spilling out into 
public, not need to deter others from committing a similar crime (again, no one is paying 
attention). The killing looks pointless in every possible way, except from the point of view of 
retributive desert. Justice would not be done if the execution were not carried out. So too would 
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it be wrong to let the death row inmate simply die rather than executing him. Justice would not 
be done. This all make senses, if look at things from the perspective of desert. When we execute 
the person, rather than letting him go or letting him die, we are making sure (even at the very end 
of his life) that he gets what he deserves. 
In this part, I raise the question of whether satisfying this idea of intrinsic desert is, after all, a 
legitimate state purpose.
147
 There has not been much sustained discussion of what purposes of 
punishment are legitimate for the state to pursue.
148
 This is in part because many people do not 
look at desert from the point of view of politics, but rather of moral philosophy—if the 
punishment serves a legitimate moral purpose, then for many philosophers, the inquiry is at an 
end. I disagree deeply with this point of view. The state is who punishes, and so in addition to 
asking whether there is some purpose to punishment, we still are not done with our inquiry. We 
have to go on to ask whether this purpose is something that the state can legitimately pursue. But 
here again we may run into a problem. The Supreme Court, in its discussions of sentencing, and 
of the death penalty in particular, has said pretty clearly that certain purposes of punishment are 
permissible for the state to pursue. It has also indicated, more generally, its tendency to defer to 
the state in deciding for what purpose it punishes. Retribution seems to always make that list, 
along with deterrence and retribution. If there is to be a convincing argument that retribution—
meting out desert—is a legitimate state purpose, then we need to dislodge the intuition that 
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retribution has to be on this list.
149
 I do this first, but noting how contingent the list of purposes 
of punishment has been in the Supreme Court. I then suggest two reasons why retribution may 
not be a permissible state purpose of punishment, making two analogies: I first analogize the 
state pursuing retribution to the state establishing a religion; second, I suggest that executing 
someone for the sake of desert, especially in the scenario where the person is on his deathbed, 
may be the product of “reason” but rather only “animus.”  
A.  Purposes of Punishment and the Supreme Court 
Given how regularly the purposes of deterrence and retribution appear in the Supreme 
Court’s death penalty jurisprudence, it is worth reminding ourselves that this was not always the 
case. In the second half of the twentieth century, the Supreme Court on many occasions said 
things suggesting that not only was retribution, in particular, on the way out as a purpose of 
punishment, it might even be the case that retribution could not a permissible purpose of 
punishment. In Williams, for instance, the Court in several places indicated that retribution was 
on its way out, to be replaced by rehabilitation and reform of offenders: “Retribution is no longer 
the dominant objective of the criminal law,” it wrote.150 “Reformation and rehabilitation of 
offenders have become important goals of criminal jurisprudence.”151 Here it may be objected 
that the Court is just making a survey of what is happening on the ground, and not necessarily 
endorsing that trend. This seems belied by the Williams opinion itself. Moreover, it other 
opinions, such as Morissette and Trop, the Court goes even further—it seems to condemn 
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retribution in pretty strong terms, looking at it as a form of brute retaliation or even revenge.
 152
 
Retribution, as opposed to reform and rehabilitation, comes to seem itself as not a “civilized” 
theory of punishment.
153
 Public safety and deterrence seem OK, and rehabilitation seems to be 
the ideal, but retribution, the Court says in so many words, is on the way out, and deservedly so. 
Our standards are evolving away from it, and the more they do so, the more appropriate it is for 
the Court to not only disparaged but to reject retribution as a permissible purpose the state can 
have in punishing someone. Retribution is a relic of a past age, a more brutal and barbaric one.
154
 
It is inconsistent with treating human beings with dignity—it seems punishment is just being 
pursued for punishment’s sake. But this gives up on the possibility of human beings to change 
and to grow and to get better. Punishment may be justified as a sad necessity to protect society; 
that is one thing. It is another thing altogether to say this person just deserves to suffer for no 
reason other than that he deserves it.  
What changed, it seems clear, is the backlash against the Court’s decision in Furman.155 
Furman had held that the application of the death penalty was cruel and unusual because of the 
way it was being applied. If the death penalty were given to people not necessarily because they 
had committed the worst crimes, but just as—to a certain degree—a matter of luck, then we 
could not say that such a policy was really fulfilling any legitimate aim of punishment. Some of 
the Justices who concurred in the opinion wanted to say that death never could satisfy a 
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legitimate aim of punishment, that death was always excessive or always cruel. 
156
 The dissenters 
said that the Constitution could not be read in a way that forbade the imposition of the death 
penalty for purely “retributive” reasons.  
Those who objected to retribution as cruel and unusual did not prevail in Furman, and the 
dissenters in that case were vindicated a few years later. And the dissenters in Furman talked 
about retribution as always have been at least a permissible purpose of punishment. They 
rejected the concurring justices in Furman as mistakenly seeing retribution itself as contrary to 
the Eighth Amendment. And it is in Gregg that retribution not only appears as a not “forbidden” 
objective of punishment, it is one that is not “inconsistent with the dignity of man.”157 
Retribution is important to channel society’s outrage (the community outrage theory) but it is 
also an expression of the community’s belief “that certain crimes are themselves so grievous an 
affront to humanity that the only adequate response may be the penalty of death.”158 This is very 
close to an exact statement of intrinsic desert retribution—that we must punish others as this is 
the only way to give them what they deserve, that this is the only appropriate way to respond to 
them, to get them back for what they have done.
159
 After Gregg, there is no serious debate as to 
whether retribution is at least a permissible purpose of punishment; indeed after Gregg, it 
becomes possible to think of retribution as again the dominant purpose of punishment, especially 
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when it comes to the penalty of death.
160
 Deterrence may be an open question, but retribution 
does not depend on the facts being one way or another. It just depends on our intuitions of 
justice. Even in his rejection of the death penalty tout court in Glossip, Justice Breyer pauses to 
acknowledge that “retribution is a valid penological goal.”161 
 Nonetheless, the debate in Furman, despite being eventually resolved in favor of retribution 
as a purpose of punishment, is instructive. It shows that the Court is open to considering—and 
maybe even rejecting—what we see now as immutable purposes of punishment. Here a passing 
comment by Justice Marshall in the Furman case may be instructive. Marshall, in his concurring 
opinion, writes of several purposes of punishment that might be at play in considering the death 
penalty. In addition to the familiar purposes, he also lists “eugenics” as one of them.162 What is 
interesting is not that Marshall finds that eugenics is not good justification for the death penalty 
(for that matter, he is skeptical that states really have procedures in place that suggest that they 
believe in the eugenics justification). After all, Marshall is persuaded that nothing could justify 
the death penalty. What is interesting is that Marshall spends any time considering the eugenic 
justification at all. He ends up spending a couple paragraphs and a footnote on it.
163
  
It seems clear, by contrast, that if such a defense of the death penalty were offered today, that 
is, a state said that it wanted to execute someone for the reason that we need to kill them in order 
to prevent them from reproducing—the Court would not discuss it in a few paragraphs and then 
dismiss it. Rather, it would reject such a purpose of punishment as wholly beyond the pale. It 
would not say that it was not a good justification. It would say it doesn’t rise to the level of a 
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legitimate reason to execute someone. And indeed, for that reason, no one would bring eugenics 
to the Court as a reason (and no one has
164
). Justice Marshall’s treatment of the eugenics 
justification is revealing, even if it was only there for reasons of comprehensiveness. Its very 
treatment shows that at least some people thought it might be a justification. It is doubtful that 
there is anyone who believes so today. That is, we have a least one example of a purpose of 
punishment that could be rejected, not because a punishment failed to fulfill that purpose, but 
because the very purpose itself was not legitimate, and so executing someone for that reason 
would be itself “cruel and unusual.”165 Could something similar be said of retribution?  
B.  Retribution as Establishment 
I should make clear at the outset what my goal in this section and the next is: to ask whether 
retribution, in the form we have developed it in considering the various kinds of Lackey claims, 
is a legitimate state purpose. I am going to proceed by making an analogy between retribution in 
this form and other kinds of disfavored—that is to say, illegitimate—state purposes. Those two 
illegitimate kinds of purpose are 1) when the government promotes some religious aim, so that it 
violates the prohibition on the state establishing a religion
166
 and 2) when the government 
advances an end based on nothing, ultimately, except passion, or caprice, or whimsy, so that that 
state action becomes without a real rational basis whatsoever, and seems to be based only on 
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“animus.”167 I am not saying that retribution is in fact an establishment of religion, of that it 
might violate the prohibition under the Fourteenth Amendment that government actions always 
have some “rational basis.”168 I am only saying that retribution as a state purpose looks an awful 
lot like these two types of illegitimate purpose, to the extent that we may wonder whether 
retribution itself is a purpose that the state cannot pursue. So I should not be taken to be saying, 
e.g., that retribution as a purpose can be challenged under the establishment clause or under the 
equal protection clause.
169
 My point is only that retribution tends to look like an illegitimate state 
purpose to the extent it resembles these other, clearly illegitimate state purposes. 
 I am also not taking another tack against retribution. The Justices who questioned 
retribution as a purpose of punishment tended to think that it, like perhaps the death penalty 
itself, was not consistent with the “dignity of human beings,” and that our “evolving standards of 
decency” had surely evolved to the point where we could recognize this fact.170 As much as I 
would like to think that this is so, I am not sure. Insofar as evolving standards of decency reflect, 
in essence, a societal consensus, it seems obvious that our current consensus supports retribution 
as a purpose of punishment.
171
 The backlash that greeted Furman surely was testament to that 
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fact. Many believe that criminals deserve to be punished, and that the death penalty is sometimes 
something that people deserve. The recent polling done in the wake of the Tsarnaev bombings 
shows that support for the death penalty, while waning, is still rather robust.
172
 To the extent that 
evolving standards of decency represents a normative judgment about whether killing people is 
consistent with treating them with dignity—I think (and have said) that this seems to be a 
contested matter. Kant thought that giving people death respects their dignity because that is 
what they deserve.
173
 To not punish them, when this is something they deserve would be to be 
treating them more as things that could not be responsible for their actions, as something less 
than human. Questions of dignity are difficult, complicated questions of morality and theology. I 
do not think we could say, conclusively, that one side or the other of the death penalty debate is 
categorically correct about what is or is not consistent with human dignity. 
 But it is on precisely this point that I want to draw the analogy between the government 
promoting retribution as a purpose of punishment and the government establishing a religious 
viewpoint. Ronald Dworkin, in his book on abortion, suggests that debates over abortion really 
reflect deeper debates about the worth and value of human life.
174
 When we argue about 
abortion, underneath it is really a kind of religious debate about what life is for, and when it 
becomes valuable. Such questions touch on matters of the intrinsic worth of humans, their 
dignity, etc.—which Dworkin puts in the category of the theological. Even though the 
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participants in these debates may not cast their positions in explicitly religious terms, it still is the 
case that what they are debating, what they are arguing about has overtones of a religious 
debate.
175
 Dworkin puts the debate in the terms of the “sacredness” of human life—is human life, 
even from the very beginning, so sacred that abortion should always be prohibited.
176
 Dworkin 
says that for the state to decide this debate in one way, viz., to say that the intrinsic value of 
human life means that abortion is never permissible would be akin to the state supporting a 
particular religion.
177
 Per the establishment clause, the government cannot demand conformity 
on a religious question—put the force of the state in support of one religious viewpoint over 
another. 
Dworkin’s argument about the “religious” nature of the abortion debate has obvious 
resonance with debates about the death penalty.
178
 People on both sides of the debate put their 
positions in terms of respect for life and its sacredness. Those who oppose the death penalty 
insist that respect for the sanctity of life means that the state should never kill. Those who favor 
the death penalty may say, to the contrary, that respect for the value of life above all means that 
those who kill must face the ultimate sanction, e.g., death—and also make a distinction between 
those who are innocent and those who by their guilt have shown they deserve to die.
179
 So the 
death penalty in many ways has characteristics of a religious debate. But my concern here is to 
show also that retribution in many ways has these characteristics as well.  
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The value of retribution is not something that can be cashed out in what we might call 
(following Dworkin again) secular values of public safety or of crime reduction; more generally, 
retribution stands in contrast to debates over the deterrence value of the death penalty. People 
who favor retribution of the intrinsic desert variety will say that there is an intrinsic value to 
executing someone—he is getting is just deserts; society is promoting justice over all and 
avoiding its complicity in the injustice of not punishing the deserving.
180
 Kant is yet again our 
standard bearer. Even if an island society were to dissolve the next day, they must still execute 
the last murderer. This is a value that could only be called intrinsic: there is nothing that the 
society “gets” from executing the murderer except the value of justice. We would be killing the 
person for the sake of nothing but justice. Such a value transcends the ordinary, instrumental 
values that are the usual stuff of government policy. In this, the debate over retribution is also a 
kind of religious debate, because the value at stake is kind of like a religious value—it has to do 
with things “higher” than preventing crime, or protecting the public. It has to do with a higher 
sort of justice. And so too (to bring this into the death penalty context) is the debate about 
whether this kind of justice when it demands death really is consistent with treating people with 
dignity, or whether it is, in a way, fundamentally undignified—“a total denial of the wrong-
doer’s dignity and worth,” as Justice Marshall puts it.181 
The scenario with which I ended Part II puts this debate clearly into focus: it is the Lackey 
analogue of Kant’s island. A person is at his deathbed, moments away from dying—and we learn 
that his appeals have been exhausted. Should society execute him? What would be the point? 
Those who believe in intrinsic desert retribution will say that justice demands that the person be 
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executed, regardless of how close he is to death. Again, there may be no secular purpose served 
by his execution, but that is not the point—the point is retribution, the point is justice! It is a 
mistake to see some other value that is supposed to be served. And I want to say here that this 
retributive value, when we see it in this context, really is akin to a sort of religious value. It is a 
value of transcendental, intrinsic importance.
182
 A state that promotes this value, that sees this 
value as being realized even in an execution in the face of someone’s imminent death, is pushing 
a religious point of view, or at least something very close to it. 
Dworkin’s position can be put against the background of a larger philosophical theory.183 On 
that theory, the government should not promote a particular religious point of view, or even more 
generally, metaphysical views about which people may generally disagree. I want to suggest that 
retribution is precisely a value of this sort
184—people who insist that retribution is a value that 
the state ought to promote are insisting on a value over which reasonable people can and do 
disagree. Compare this to punishment for the sake of public safety, or crime control. These 
values—secular values, using Dworkin’s framework—are values that most people can agree 
upon, and see punishment as reasonably related to. It is not obvious that retribution is like this—
certainly not to the extent that retribution would need to be insisted upon even up to the 
execution of a person already dying. There, we see retribution as the only value at play, not 
mixed in with other values such as deterrence or incapacitation--the person is incapacitated, the 
deterrence value of killing him rather than letting him die would be nil. It is not that retribution 
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in a circumstance like that would be pointless. For those who believe in intrinsic desert 
retribution, it is not pointless, indeed justice demands. It is that pursuing retribution in this case 
would be to pursue a goal the state should not be able permissibly to pursue. But in the end it 
does suggest a sort of modified Lackey claim. Such an execution would be cruel and unusual, not 
because the execution would serve no purpose, but that it would serve no purpose that 
governments can legitimately pursue in punishing someone. Retribution might be satisfied in 
executing the person on his deathbed, but this kind of retribution is something that is not the 
government’s business.185 
C.  Retribution as Animus 
It may seem odd to claim that retribution as a purpose of punishment may both be in service 
of some transcendental value and also be the result of passion and caprice. But retribution may 
seem—and has seemed this way to many people—to traffic in both of these possibilities. At a 
minimum, state action has at least to be based in some reason; it has to be rational, to fulfill 
some public purpose.
186
 State action cannot be based simply in someone’s passion, or desire to 
see some result done. And it may be the case that retribution as a goal is cover just for people’s 
passions—their desire for revenge, for instance. And many have collapsed retribution and 
revenge in precisely this way.
187
 When you take away any public purpose, any desire for 
deterrence or for public safety, you are left simply with the bare desire to avenge the wrong, the 
bare desire to “get back” at the person who has harmed you. This may make sense as an 
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individual matter, but it may be illegitimate when it comes to a state purpose. What is the state’s 
interest in allowing people to vent their passions in this way, by causing harm to another just for 
the sake of revenge? Note that at least the community outrage version of retribution based its 
need for punishment on the fear that if not satisfied the anger of the community would break out 
in vigilante justice. That is a public purpose: the desire to prevent individuals from taking the law 
into their hands, and making punishment a matter of personal vendetta. As Justice Marshall 
observed in his dissent to Gregg, this ground of punishment can sound even utilitarian: we must 
punish so that we prevent society from dissolving into chaos, with people seeking out on their 
own to carry out justice.
188
 We need to restrain them, so we punish, sometimes even executing 
people. 
If we take the Part II scenario again, and look at in terms of revenge rather than in terms of 
intrinsic desert, we also see similarities. A person is at his deathbed, and we insist on the need to 
execute him. There is again no purpose served here in terms of deterrence, or in terms of public 
safety. Perhaps there is a need to satisfy community outrage, but it must be quite small: the 
person is about to die anyway, and it seems plausible that at this point, the main people 
interested will be those who are personally invested in seeing the person die rather than the 
community at large.
189
 What explains why we must do the executing, rather than just letting 
nature take its course—to let the person die on his own and without the help of the state? We 
might even say that the retributive interest here is so slight, the difference between dying in a 
state institution and being executed by that state institution, that the only possible remain 
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explanation of the desire to kill the person has to be not based on a reason, but based on just the 
bare desire to be the instrument of this person’s death.190 Motives that are based in nothing but 
passion—and not in any overarching state purpose—are sometimes called arbitrary, but this is 
just a shorthand for saying that what is motivating state action is really just animus, pure and 
simple. There is nothing we could point to and say: “Yes, this is the reason we have to do this.” 
Isn’t the execution of a dying man more a matter of spite than anything else? “No, you can’t 
cheat your punishment,” we can imagine the executioner saying, “even at this late date. It is up to 
us whether you live or die; it is not up to you or to God. That’s what your punishment means—
and the present circumstances don’t change that.” This, if anything, looks a lot like the 
“gratuitous infliction of suffering.”191 Or, to put it in the language of animus, the only thing 
grounding the law is “a bare . . . desire to harm a politically unpopular group,” something which 
“cannot constitute a legitimate governmental interest.”192 
There has been a more or less ongoing debate over whether retribution as such is just a 
matter of revenge. Robert Nozick famously made a point of distinguishing how retribution was 
different than revenge. 
193
 Nozick said, inter alia, that retribution was a matter of justice, and not 
a personal vendetta;
194
 that retribution focused only on the wrong and not the person; that 
retribution wanted just to punish the person who did the wrong, and revenge did not so limit 
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itself. All of these points of contrast are well-taken. But it does not seem to follow that a state 
punishment could never in fact be a vehicle of a person’s revenge. Maybe all of the usual 
features of retribution are there, but only in sort of a formal way, so that the only real remaining 
driving purpose to the punishment is to satisfy someone’s desire for revenge. What substantively 
is driving the punishment is revenge—even though the punishment does look to be retributive in 
all of the ways Nozick identifies, e.g., it is done by the state against the person for his wrong and 
is limited only to the punishment of the person who has done the wrong.
195
 And isn’t this close to 
what we have in the case of killing the dying man? What is left of the usual retributive function 
of punishment? He is about to die anyway, and that seems close enough. Add to this the fact of 
delay, and the likely subsequent reduction in the community’s interest in seeing justice done, and 
you have the form of retribution but the substance of revenge.
196
 Nozick’s typology may fit as a 
broad matter and may fit most cases where retribution is presented as a justification for 
punishment; but it does not seem to adequately capture cases like this one. Of course, it does not 
follow that such a punishment has to be one that is motivated by revenge. Again, I have just 
presented an argument for retribution that casts it in terms of a transcendent value, the value of 
giving a person what he deserves. It is possible that this really is what the state wants. But it is 
interesting that we can also give an explanation that the state in this case is just pursuing 
revenge, and that the punishment here is not motivated by reason but by passion.
197
 
Once more then, we can run a Lackey claim along these lines—but one slightly different than 
the one canvassed at the end of Part I, and developed a little further in Part II. It is not that 
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retribution as a goal is no longer fulfilled by the execution; it is, rather, at some point, retribution 
is no longer a suitable state purpose in punishing someone. We have gone from saying that the 
execution would be pointless because it would no longer fulfill retribution to saying that the 
execution would be cruel and unusual because no permissible state punishment could be 
fulfilled. This is similar to the original Lackey claim, but more radical. It goes to attacking a 
purpose of punishment as legitimate, rather than conceding the purpose is legitimate but not 
realized by the execution.
198
 To be sure, this is a harder argument to make. Retribution has long 
been held to be a legitimate purpose of punishment, although support for it on the Supreme Court 
has waxed and waned at least when it comes to the death penalty.
199
 And I have certainly not 
done the work to show that retribution in all of its instances is only either an impermissible sort 
of “establishment of religion” or otherwise just motivated by pure passion and so having no 
“rational basis.”200 That would be a strong claim, and probably false. But it may be enough to 
show that at some point in the state’s planned execution of a prisoner, the purpose of retribution 
begins to change its cast. It becomes to look less likely an ordinary goal of punishment and more 
like a kind a religious mission or personal vendetta. I merely assert that conclusion here; but I 
hope to have said enough to show why I think that suggestion is, to me, persuasive. 
V. Conclusion 
This paper started with consideration of a very specific type of claim, viz., the idea that a 
certain punishment—death—might be cruel and unusual because, after a certain amount of 
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delay, that punishment would be pointless. In particular, I considered and developed in Part I the 
idea that putting a person to death after substantial delay would no longer have a point given 
certain theories of retributive punishment. On one theory, this kind of Lackey claim would work. 
If retributive punishment were merely a matter of community outrage, then it was plausible 
(although not necessarily always true) that community outrage would fade over time, and the 
community might come to forgive the person who committed such an awful crime—or at least 
grow indifferent to him. If that happened, then it would indeed be pointless to punish the person 
with death. What would be the point? The community had gotten over its outrage. To kill the 
person on death row would be needlessly cruel, because it would be pointless. So on one version 
of retributivism, the Lackey claim had a good chance of succeeding. 
However, community outrage was not, I argued, a good way to understand retribution. A 
better theory (one which I think captures better what most people think of as retribution and is 
also the most philosophically defensible) would be one that saw punishing people as a matter of 
giving them what they deserved. If we adopted this theory of retribution, a Lackey claim 
becomes much harder to make. Although it might be better to kill the person sooner rather than 
later, it is not obvious that there is some point where the person would no longer “deserve” to 
die. If his crime demanded a punishment of death, then he should get death—whether it is today, 
tomorrow, or 10 years down the road. Moreover, on intrinsic desert retributivism, at least as I 
understand it, no amount of other types of suffering can make up for the fact that the person 
deserves to die. Unless he is given the death penalty, we have a kind of injustice. He is not being 
given what he deserves—and so he should be given the death penalty even if he is on his 
deathbed, moments away from death. After all, his punishment was to be executed by the state, 
not just to die while being imprisoned by the state. 
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It is after reaching this peculiar result at the end of Part II that my paper took on a much 
broader target: the theory of retribution itself, and especially as a theory of what the state might 
permissibly do. What would it mean for a theory to require as a matter of justice that someone on 
his or her deathbed be killed? Such a theory seemed to me to be of one of two varieties, neither 
entirely suitable for a government to adopt. First, the theory could be a sort of religious one, 
which saw the intrinsic value of giving people what they deserved, even if this had no practical, 
earthly benefit. The second saw the need to kill someone even as they were dying as a kind of 
revenge—the need to have the last word, even if no purpose were served by the person being 
killed seconds before he was going to die anyway. I then proposed that neither of these purposes 
might be legitimate for the state to have. The first represented a sort of establishment of religion 
by the state—promoting one intrinsic value that some people might disagree was a value. The 
second ran the risk of grounding state policy just on bare “animus” alone: the desire to see 
someone killed by us rather than just dead. Of course, both these interpretations of retribution 
(and the rejection of them as legitimate state goals) might be seen as just begging the question 
against retribution. The whole idea of an intrinsic value is that it does not depend on contingent 
goods being realized—they are ends in themselves.201 If this is so, then my paper may be seen as 
suggesting the more modest point that at least some intrinsic values are not proper, that is to say, 
legitimate state goals because they look too much like things that are not legitimate state goals, 
viz., establishment of religion and animus. 
Could my overall argument be used to ground a Lackey claim? I offered as much at the end 
of Part III, but it may pay to reiterate that claim here, and extend it. If a person is dying, and the 
state insists on executing him, I think that the desire to punish for the sake of retribution would 
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 See, David Dolinko, Retributivism, Consequentialism, and the Intrinsic Goodness of Punishment, 16 L. & PHIL. 
507 (1997) (refuting the validity of a “consequentialist version of retributivism”). 
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then be cruel and unusual—not because the execution would not fulfill some retributive purpose 
(it might) but because retribution in that context would be an illegitimate state purpose. This may 
seem a very circumscribed claim, if it means only asserting a Lackey claim for clients who are on 
death’s row and also on death’s door. But I could see the claim being presented in the following 
way: if life in prison really is secure, and there is no risk of the prisoner escaping, and therefore 
we have a certainty that the person will in fact die in prison, then the further drive to not let the 
person simply die in prison but the need to kill him before he dies seems to traffic in the same 
sort of illegitimate desire for retribution.
202
 Whether this means that, ultimately, retribution is 
never a legitimate purpose the state can have in punishing I leave for another day.
203
 But I do 
want to close by noting that it was not always obvious to some members of the Supreme Court 
that retribution could be a proper purpose of punishment—and it is not out of the question that it 
may again seem that way to the Court sometime in the future.  
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